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INTRODUCTION
The decrease in U.S. housing prices—often called the “end of the
housing bubble”—has brought about a tremendous increase in
mortgage foreclosures and defaults. That in turn has spawned an
ongoing controversy about what, if anything, the government should
do to intervene in this situation. One of the major questions has been
under what circumstances the political branches should alter private
contracts, such as mortgage loan agreements and the agreements that
govern the servicing of securitized mortgage loans.1 Ad hoc
1 See, e.g., Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009 § 201(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1639a
(2006 & Supp. II 2007–2009) (effectively modifying mortgage pooling-and-servicing
agreements by extinguishing contractual remedies against servicers who make specified types of
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interventions, such as legislative changes to servicing agreements that
shield servicers from liability for making loan modifications—
justified as they may be in a foreclosure crisis—raise troubling
questions of fairness and rent-seeking behavior, as well as legal
issues.2
But apart from the issue of whether and how the political branches
should rewrite contracts in the latest financial upheaval, there is
another question raised by what appears to be the second asset-bubble
deflation in a decade: Is there any significance to the existence and
persistence of asset-price bubbles from the perspective of contract
law? As the government exercises its general regulatory power to
rewrite some private contracts and not others—depending inevitably
on political considerations to make the distinction—less attention is
devoted to whether these contracts ought to be enforced under
contract-law principles in the first place.
Asset-price bubbles have been analyzed only to a limited extent in
legal scholarship, and the work that has been done mostly takes a
regulatory perspective: What rules might governments, acting directly
through the political process or through administrative agencies,
adopt to control asset bubbles, assuming that transactions made
during a bubble will be enforced?3 Scholars have not examined what
is arguably the antecedent question of how asset-price bubbles
interact with private ordering on a fundamental level. That question
lies within the domain of contract law:
This Article presents the first such examination, taking as its
premise that we ought to take bubbles seriously. It asks what happens
if contract law takes seriously the widely embraced (though disputed)
proposition that financial markets are given to bubbles—bouts of
mania when poor-quality traders drive up prices—that can be
identified with confidence only after the fact. It answers that courts

loan modifications).
2 See, e.g., Talcott J. Franklin, Mortgage Servicer Safe Harbor: A Legal and Policy
Analysis 38–40 (2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (presenting constitutional
argument against adoption of legislation that would shield mortgage servicers from litigation
under existing contracts).
3 See, e.g., Erik F. Gerding, Laws Against Bubbles: An Experimental-Asset-Market
Approach to Analyzing Financial Regulation, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 977, 989 (evaluating proposed
rules to control asset bubbles in light of evidence from experimental economics); Frank Partnoy,
Why Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741 (2000) (arguing
for regulatory choice in public lending and dilution of family ownership of large firms to control
asset bubbles). William Fisher argues that the securities-fraud theory of fraud on the market
should not apply during a bubble. William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us
Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 EMORY L.J. 843, 930–31 (2005) (arguing that “rationality
cannot be presumed” during a bubble).
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might order rescission or equitable adjustment of bubble contracts,
because the reasons generally given for supporting private ordering
do not apply to bubbles.
As between rescission and equitable adjustment, rescission has the
advantage of sending a clear signal that should help prevent bubbles.
Equitable adjustment is more flexible and avoids potentially high
remedy administration costs from rescinding large numbers of bubble
contracts.
Applying an ex post remedy to financial bubbles avoids a
fundamental problem that underlies regulatory suggestions that have
been advanced to address the issue: the fact that regulators may not
on average have foresight superior to that of market participants.4
This supports either approach.
This Article proceeds in three Parts. The first argues that outbreaks
of poor judgment that drive up asset prices very likely do exist and
can be identified, even if only after the fact. It also argues that
bubbles are likely to be destructive. This assertion requires some
preliminary exposition of how bubbles should be defined and what it
means to identify them. The second Part argues that the distinctive
characteristics of bubbles make them inappropriate for private
ordering, drawing on the contract doctrines of incapacity, mistake,
and misrepresentation. The third Part discusses the remedies of
rescission and equitable adjustment and sketches how they might
work in the context of stock-market and real-estate bubbles.
I. THE EXISTENCE AND IDENTIFICATION OF BUBBLES
A. Definitions
I start by adopting and defending definitions of key terms. Bubbles
are defined in different ways by different authors. The different
definitions all capture the same or similar phenomena, but they raise
different issues of identifying and proving the existence of asset
bubbles. For example, a definition based on fundamental asset values
raises the question of how to measure fundamental value in the real
world. A definition based on price behavior—such as “any fast rise
4 Alan Greenspan famously raised this point in 1996: “But how do we know when
irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become subject to
unexpected and prolonged contractions as they have in Japan over the past decade? And how do
we factor that assessment into monetary policy? We as central bankers need not be concerned if
a collapsing financial asset bubble does not threaten to impair the real economy, its production,
jobs, and price stability.” Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., The Challenge of
Central Banking in a Democratic Society, Remarks at the Annual Dinner and Francis Boyer
Lecture of The American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Dec. 5, 1996),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/19961205.htm.
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and sudden crash of prices is a bubble”—raises the question of
whether it makes sense to treat all such price patterns identically. I
propose a definition based on the characteristics of traders and the
effect of those characteristics on financial markets.
1. Judgment
The idea of judgment is central both to the definition of a bubble
that I adopt and to the contract-law doctrines I discuss. This concept
apparently has received less attention than it deserves from legal
academia;5 in this context, I refer to the reasonableness of the trader’s
conception of future outcomes.6
The type of poor judgment that is most relevant to this Article is
unreasonable optimism—not the optimism that an economist would
call “irrational,”7 but optimism that is unreasonable.8 For example, if
a person flips a coin, and he or she believes that the coin is eighty
percent weighted to heads, there is no way in advance to say that this
belief reflects poor judgment. If, after one thousand flips, the coin
flipper maintains this belief after the coin comes up heads 501 times
and tails 499 times in a thousand flips, he is probably exercising poor

5 Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763,
789 (1983) (“[T]he nature of judgment . . . [is] a subject neglected in the law and economics
literature (and elsewhere).”).
6 Kronman defines judgment, following Arendt, as the “faculty of moral imagination, the
capacity to form an imaginative conception of the moral consequences of a proposed course of
action and to anticipate its effect on one’s character.” Id. at 790 (footnote omitted). The
definition of “judgment” in this Article is similar to Kronman’s in that it focuses on the actor’s
ability to imagine the future, which may “requir[e] disengagement from the immediacy of
desire,” but I do not limit judgment to moral imagination or the relevant future consequences to
effects “on one’s character.” Id. at 789; cf. Peter H. Huang, Regulating Irrational Exuberance
and Anxiety in Securities Markets, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR
501, 505–06 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds. 2005) (“‘[I]rrational exuberance’ refers
to exuberance that is not justified by merely cognitive processing of the available information
about securities markets.”).
7 See MARK RUBINSTEIN, A HISTORY OF THE THEORY OF INVESTMENTS: MY
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 88–93 (2006) (describing development theory of rational choice in
terms of four axioms of completeness, transitivity, continuity, and independence of preferences).
8 The precise mental state may be further specified as including failure to “imagine ways
that a chosen option might fail or an ignored option might succeed” or to “consider
counterarguments and opposing viewpoints” or to “give reasons for . . . choices.” Gregory
Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1245, 1255–56 (2005).
But that is not important for the Article’s purpose; what is important is that the actor forms
unreasonable beliefs about the future.
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judgment.9 Poor judgment cannot be proven with absolute certainty,
but it can be inferred.10
The concept of judgment is not limited to situations involving an
explicit conception of probabilities. It applies to any scenario in
which the actor underweighs or disregards bad outcomes. When a
person decides not to wear a seatbelt while driving, that person is in
all likelihood exercising poor judgment by believing that “I won’t be
in an accident,” even if the person has no conscious concept of the
probabilities involved and, if asked, would not say that the probability
of being in an accident is zero percent.
The qualification “in all likelihood” reflects the possibility that our
seatbelt-free rider may find seatbelts especially uncomfortable, enjoy
the risk of injury or death, highly value the relief that comes from
taking such a risk without being injured, and so forth. The arguments
requiring us to qualify the seatbelt example with “in all likelihood”
are analogous to arguments often made about asset bubbles, namely
that they cannot be distinguished from changes in the actor’s risk
preference or preference for current versus future consumption. 11 In
both cases, it is very difficult to establish poor judgment with
certainty, but poor judgment nevertheless can exist and the law can
take account of this. The law requires seatbelts even if the
requirement harms some people who are not exercising poor
judgment, such as risk-lovers who simply enjoy not wearing seatbelts
and do so with full knowledge and appropriate understanding of the
possible consequences.
Apart from the reasons for not wearing seatbelts just discussed
(those arising from the person’s subjective preferences), we can
imagine another possibility. Perhaps the driver, who otherwise acts as
though she correctly anticipates the probability of an accident,
9 The theory of statistical inference provides a way of thinking about this in the context
of fixed probability distributions, although this field has its own philosophical controversies. See
MORRIS H. DEGROOT & MARK J. SCHERVISH, PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 328 (3d ed. 2002)
(describing disagreement over whether an unknown statistical characteristic of a population
(“parameter”) can properly be conceived of as a random variable).
10 The notion of judgment here is not premised on any particular psychological model, and
this Article is not intended as a work of behavioral law and economics. See Christine Jolls et al.,
A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1475 (1998)
(“Behavioral economics . . . suggests . . . that behavior is systematic and can be modeled.”).
Likewise, I eschew the formalistic definitions of, and debates over, rationality and irrationality
beloved by some economists. Although much of what is said here could be rephrased in terms of
various cognitive biases that cause people to violate various canons of rationality, I intentionally
use a way of thinking that is more congenial to traditional contract-law analysis.
11 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1583–84 (1991)
(noting the argument by some scholars that “if variation in expected returns is common to
different securities, then it is probably a rational result of variation in tastes for current versus
future consumption or in the investment opportunities of firms”).
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believes that important technological developments will have
occurred since the last time she ventured out, and that the other cars
she encounters are likely to feature automatic accident-aversion
systems that radically reduce the probability of an accident.12
If this turns out not to be the case, can we say for sure that the
person exercised poor judgment? No. Our driver might have correctly
assessed the probability that the improvements would materialize. It
might simply have been bad luck that they did not. But poor judgment
seems to be a more likely explanation of the situation. This example
corresponds to another argument frequently made about bubbles. The
car-safety improvements in this example correspond to the “new-era
thinking” that commonly accompanies boom-and-bust price behavior.
It is sometimes argued that bubbles cannot be shown to exist because
one cannot infer poor judgment with certainty from such new-era
thinking. But in both the case of the seatbelt-free driver and that of
the optimistic trader, other facts and circumstances permit us to make
an informed, if not perfect, inference about whether poor judgment
was the likely cause of the observed behavior.13
2. Low-Quality Trader
A low-quality trader is a trader14 who has poor judgment. The poor
judgment may arise from cognitive errors, a lack of information
relative to other traders, or from some other source.15 The precise
baseline is not as important as the concept, but poor judgment can be
measured relative to a number of different baselines: it might be
judgment as poor as that of traders who drive asset prices to
irrationally high values in experimental markets,16 or judgment
materially worse than that of the average trader who is not involved in
a bubble, or, following the Restatement (Second) of Contract’s
(“Restatement”) treatment of contractual capacity, judgment so poor
that it causes the trader to act unreasonably with respect to the subject
matter.17

12 See, e.g., The Connected Car, THE ECONOMIST, June 6, 2009, at 18 (“vehicle-tovehicle” networks may soon alert cars that are out of visual range of sudden braking or airbag
deployments to avert accidents).
13 See discussion infra Part I.C–0.
14 The term “trader” raises a question of scope. I will define a “trader” as anyone
participating in a market that is not for goods or services for immediate consumption.
15 Cognitive errors and information asymmetry, along with moral hazard, are the three
reasons Frank Partnoy identifies for market crashes. Partnoy, supra note 3, at 754–62.
16 See discussion infra Part I.B.2.
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14–16 (1981) (discussing the effects
of minority, mental illness or defect, and intoxication on a person’s capacity to contract).
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The “low-quality” trader is similar to the “irrational” or “noise
trader” that appears in asset-bubble models such as those of Andrei
Shleifer.18 Low-quality traders and noise traders are not the same,
however, because a noise trader is defined as a trader who lacks
knowledge of fundamental asset values,19 and fundamental asset
values are not used the analysis of bubbles presented here.
3. High-Quality Trader
A high-quality trader is a trader who is not a low-quality trader,
similar to the informed trader or arbitrageur in some models.20
Although informed traders are sometimes assumed to trade according
to fundamental value, no such assumption is made here.21 A highquality trader may trade, for example, based on assessments of
fundamental asset values or according to a momentum strategy that
does not make depend on fundamental asset values.
4. Bubble-Like Price Behavior
Bubble-like price behavior has two elements: boom and bust. A
boom is an increase in asset prices beyond what would be supported
by traditional measures of asset value. For stocks, such traditional
measures include dividend-price and price-earnings ratios.22 For
housing, such traditional measures include the ratio of house prices to
rents.23 A bust is a decrease in asset prices that is so large that it
appears unlikely based on prices’ historical volatility.24
A boom is often treated as a necessary condition for an asset
bubble, specified sometimes in terms of an unprecedented, large,
18 See, e.g., ANDREI SHLEIFER, INEFFICIENT MARKETS: AN I NTRODUCTION TO
BEHAVIORAL FINANCE 28–52 (2000) (describing “noise trader” risk in financial markets).
19 See id. at 2 (defining “rational” traders as those who “value each security for its
fundamental value: the net present value of its future cash flows, discounted using their risk
characteristics”); id. at 10 (defining “noise” traders as those that are not fully rational); id. at 33
(“Noise traders form erroneous beliefs about the future distribution of returns on a risky asset.”).
20 Id. at 33 (explaining that arbitrageurs “exploit noise traders’ misperceptions” and “push
prices toward fundamentals, but not all the way”).
21 Id.
22 See John Y. Campbell & Robert J. Shiller, Valuation Ratios and the Long-Run Stock
Market Outlook: An Update (Yale Univ. Cowles Found. for Research in Econ. Discussion Paper
Series, Paper No. 1295, 2001), available at http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cd/d12b/d1295.pdf.
23 See John Krainer & Chishen Wei, House Prices and Fundamental Value, Fed. Reserve
Bank of S.F. Economic Letter No. 2004–27 (Oct. 1, 2004), available at http://www.frbsf.org/
publications/economics/letter/2004/el2004-27.html (documenting dramatic increase in U.S.
price-to-rent ratio from 1995 to 2004, highly concentrated in certain coastal markets).
24 Volatility is a measure of how much returns (or, ignoring interim cash flows such as
dividends and coupon payments, prices) change over time. See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS,
FUTURES AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 238 (5th ed. 2002). “High market volatility” is often a
euphemism for a crash.
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rapid, or unsustainable rise in prices rather than, or in addition to,
according to the relationship between prices and a traditional measure
of value.25 Busts are often treated as common but unnecessary
elements of bubbles. Although busts (or “crashes”) often follow
booms,26 an asset bubble may deflate slowly without a dramatic
crash.27
Because I define asset bubbles in terms of the influence of poorquality traders on price, neither a boom nor a bust is strictly necessary
for a bubble. In practice, boom-and-bust price behavior will be an
important piece of evidence supporting the existence of a bubble.28
5. Bubble
Definition
A bubble is a situation in which the price of a class of assets (such
as stocks or real estate) increases because of the activities of lowquality traders. Bubbles are phenomena that result from outbreaks of
poor judgment on the market. Such outbreaks could occur because
people who do not know what they are doing are attracted to the
market or because a social dynamic causes a decline in existing
participants’ judgment. Given the types of evidence that are likely to
be available, and the nature of the bubble phenomenon, bubbles are
more likely to be identified on an aggregate, market-wide basis than
on an individual basis. The method for identifying a bubble is not to
compare the level of judgment exhibited by each individual trader to a
prescribed standard; instead, it is to look for episodes that most likely
are the result of outbreaks of poor judgment, as suggested by the
types of evidence identified below.29

25 See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS, AND CRASHES:
A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES 29 (5th ed. 2005) (“[A] bubble is an upward price movement
over an extended period of fifteen to forty months that then implodes.”); id. at 1 (“Bubbles
always implode; by definition a bubble involves a nonsustainable pattern of price changes or
cash flows.”); cf. Markus K. Brunnermeier, Bubbles, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 578, 578 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume ed. 2008) (“Bubbles are
typically associated with dramatic asset price increases followed by a collapse. Bubbles arise if
the price exceeds the asset’s fundamental value.”).
26 Brunnermeier, supra note 25, at 578 (noting that at the end of the Internet stock bubble,
an index of Internet share prices fell by over seventy-five percent between March and December
2000).
27 Robert J. Shiller, That Stock Market Bubble Won’t Burst — But It’s Leaking,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 21, 2000, at E1 (“Major speculative bubbles . . . tend to
deflate over a period of years.”).
28 See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
29 See discussion infra Part I.C.
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Comparison to Alternative Definitions of Bubbles
Boom-and-bust price behavior. A bubble might be defined as an
instance of boom-and-bust price behavior.30 Boom-and-bust price
behavior is not a satisfactory definition for a bubble for the purposes
of this Article, because boom-and-bust behavior can be completely
consistent with good judgment. Consider a fair lottery in which 1000
tickets have been sold at a price of $1 for a $1000 prize to be awarded
based on a drawing in two weeks. Now assume that the lottery
authority announces unexpectedly (but credibly) that it will increase
the prize to $2000 if a coin flip one week from now comes up heads,
and that it will not sell any more lottery tickets or make any other
adjustments to the prize. If the price of lottery tickets immediately
rises to $1.50 after this announcement, nothing evidencing poor
judgment has happened. The price movement is completely explained
by the increase in expected value of the prize. Assume the authority
then conducts the coin flip, observes tails, and announces that the
prize will be $1000 after all. If the price of tickets then drops to $1,
again nothing suggests the presence of poor judgment. The drop in
price is explained by the decrease in expected value of the prize.
Boom-and-bust price behavior has occurred, but there is no evidence
of poor judgment.
A similar story can be told about boom-and-bust behavior of asset
prices in the real world. For example, it is argued that the rise and fall
of the NASDAQ reflect perfectly reasonable, but ultimately
disappointed hopes that the Internet would revolutionize business to
the benefit of existing dot-com firms.31 That a good outcome—
plausible ex ante—did not happen to materialize is a reason that
prices may crash, but does not have particularly interesting
implications for contract law, as a fundamental and well-understood
function of contract is to allocate such risks.32
30 See Randall Kroszner, Asset Price Bubbles, Information, and Public Policy, in ASSET
PRICE BUBBLES: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR MONETARY, REGULATORY AND INTERNATIONAL
POLICIES 3, 4 (William C. Hunter et al. eds. 2005) (“An asset price that soars and then
subsequently crashes is the standard example of what many think of as [standard] bubble
behavior.”); Robert J. Shiller, Diverse Views on Asset Bubbles, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra,
at 35 (“By a bubble, some seem to mean any period when asset prices rise and then fall.”).
31 See, e.g., Douglas Clement, Interview with Eugene Fama, THE REGION (Dec. 2007),
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=1134 (arguing that the
“more recent climb and decline of the market in the early 2000s” was not the result of “irrational
exuberance”, but rather, “exactly what you’d expect if the market’s efficient”); Jean-Claude
Trichet, President, Eur. Cent. Bank, Asset Price Bubbles and Monetary Policy, Speech at the
Mas
Lecture,
Monetary
Authority
of
Singapore,
1
(June
8,
2005),
http://www.bis.org/review/r050614d.pdf (“Well reputed economists claim that even the most
famous historical bubbles . . . can be explained by fundamentally justified expectations . . . .”).
32 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 127–28
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Indeed, it is never possible to rule out such an explanation with
total certainty, because the real world features uncertain outcomes
(the Internet will change business, but who will profit and how
much?) and unknown probability distributions (knowledge of a
“1/1000 probability of winning the prize” is rare). Even so, I argue
that it is possible to identify circumstances in which it is more likely
that traders with poor judgment are driving up asset prices,33 and that
this has consequences for how we should apply contract doctrines in
such circumstances.34 Boom-and-bust prices suggest, but do not
conclusively prove, the existence of a bubble.
Departure from fundamental value. A common definition of a
bubble among economists is that bubbles exist when asset prices
depart significantly from fundamental values.35 The fundamental
value of a security is defined in turn as the net present value of future
cash flows, adjusted for risk.36
Despite the convenience of this definition for economic theory, it
has at least two important shortcomings for my purposes. First,
attitudes toward risk make the definition indeterminate. Even if the
probability distribution of future returns is known, market value is not
necessarily equal to the expected value of the asset computed
according to that probability distribution. For example, in the first
stage of the lottery-ticket example above, the expected value of the
ticket was $1. But potential buyers might prefer $1 in hand to a 0.1%
chance of winning $1000. Indeed, this attitude—called “risk
aversion”—is often considered the basic psychological fact about
investors.37 If the buyers are risk averse, then fundamental value
could be anywhere between $0 and $1. Conversely, if investors are
risk seeking, then fundamental value could be anywhere from $1 to
$1000. Only if they are risk neutral would the fundamental value have
to be equal to $1. Such varying attitudes toward risk are expressions
of preference.

(1993).
33

See discussiob infra Part I.C.
See discussion infra Part III.
35 See Trichet, supra note 31, at 2 (explaining that a bubble occurs when there are “large
and increasing deviations of asset prices from their fundamental values”).
36 E.g., SHLEIFER, supra note 18, at 2. For assets such as houses that (unlike securities)
have significant consumption value apart from their promised future cash flows, the notion of
fundamental value is further complicated as this value must be captured.
37 See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 40 (providing formula that demonstrates that a
gamble is worth less than its expected value given certain assumed characteristics of the
gambler). Risk aversion is invoked to explain why historically riskier assets, such as stocks,
have often exhibited higher average returns than historically less risky assets, such as Treasury
bonds. Investors must be paid a higher return to overcome their distaste for risk.
34
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Second, financial assets in the real world are not like lottery tickets
or bets on dice. The probabilities of their future cash flows are not
known. They are subject not just to risk (“known unknowns”), but to
uncertainty (“unknown unknowns”).38 It simply is not possible to say
for certain after the fact that a particular computation of expected
value was flawed ex ante.39 Although one might say the same for a
definition in terms of judgment, the judgment-based approach has the
advantage of being more relevant to conventional legal analysis of
contracts. Moreover, legal institutions in general are accustomed to
dealing with problematic but useful mental constructs such as intent.
Price-to-price feedback/social contagion. Others define asset
bubbles in terms of price-to-price feedback loops. The idea is that
high prices attract buyers who drive up prices and attract more
buyers.40 One specific way in which price-to-price feedback loops
might work is “social contagion,” in which price increases feed a
popular belief that prices will continue to go up, even when other
evidence suggests that they are unsustainably high.41 Although
nothing here is inconsistent with the idea that such feedback loops are
extremely important in attracting low-quality traders to the market (or
of degrading existing traders’ judgment), the definition of a bubble I
employ does not exclude reasons other than feedback loops for poorquality trading.42

38 This distinction is frequently credited to Frank Knight. See FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK,
UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 233 (The Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) (1921) (using “risk” and
“uncertainty” to refer to “measurable” and “unmeasurable” probabilities of future events).
39 See Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986) (“All estimates of value are noisy,
so we can never know how far away price is from value.”).
40 Robert Shiller and Andrei Shleifer are particularly important figures who use this
definition. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 2 (2d ed. 2005) (“[N]ews
of price increases spurs investor enthusiasm, which spreads by psychological contagion from
person to person, in the process amplifying stories that might justify the price increases and
bringing in a larger and larger class of investors.”); SHLEIFER, supra note 18, at 154–55
(explaining that “positive feedback trading” describes the behavior of uninformed traders in
bubbles); Shiller, supra note 30, at 35 (“The traditional notion of a speculative bubble is . . . a
period when investors are attracted to an investment irrationally because rising prices encourage
them to expect, at some level of consciousness at least, more price increases. A feedback
develops—as people become more and more attracted, there are more and more price
increases.”).
41 See Robert J. Shiller, Infectious Exuberance, THE ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2008, at 19, 20
(discussing the phenomenon of social contagion in the context of the recent housing boom).
42 For example, there is evidence that individuals buy stocks of companies that are
mentioned in news stories. See Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, All That Glitters: The Effect
of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors 15–21
(Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=460660. Although the authors did not test whether news stories that did not
mention price caused buying, the result is nevertheless suggestive.

9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM

2010]

TAKING BUBBLES SERIOUSLY

13

6. Bubble Contract
A bubble contract is a contract entered into during a bubble that
has as its subject matter an asset within the class affected by the
bubble. An example would be a contract to buy or sell an asset when
prices are affected by the bubble, or a contract to finance the purchase
or sale of such an asset.
B. Existence of Bubbles
It is a fairly widespread view among economists that bubbles
simply do not exist, or at least that an event should not be called a
bubble except as a “last resort.”43 This Section reviews three different
types of evidence suggesting that judgment-driven bubbles exist: In a
laboratory setting, experiments directly support the point. In realworld markets, financial economists have amassed empirical evidence
that traders who consistently lose money also exert temporary upward
pressure on prices. And finally, market participants have consistently
identified and do consistently identify bubbles in their surroundings, a
fact that is itself a potent argument that bubbles exist.
1. Evidence from Experimental Economics
As discussed, it is impossible to determine fundamental asset
values in real life.44 That is why this Article does not make use of the
concept of fundamental value in defining real-life asset bubbles. No
matter how suggestive the evidence, it is always possible to make an
argument—perhaps a tenuous one, but an argument nonetheless—that
prices were not really different from fundamental value. But
economists have set up experiments in which fundamental values are
known (or at least bounded) because asset returns follow known
probability distributions.45 Erik Gerding has recently introduced this
work to the law-review literature.46
43 PETER M. GARBER, FAMOUS FIRST BUBBLES: THE FUNDAMENTALS OF EARLY MANIAS
124 (2000); see also Gerding, supra note 3, at 991–92 (noting the existence of controversies
over whether past events were bubbles); Kroszner, supra note 30, at 4 (“Identifying asset price
bubbles is quite difficult both ex ante and ex post.”); Trichet, supra note 31, at 1 (“There is no
consensus about the existence of asset price bubbles in the economics profession.”).
44 See Martin Dufwenberg et al., Bubbles and Experience: An Experiment, 95 AM. ECON.
REV. 1731, 1731 (2005) (“[F]undamental values are usually not observable.”).
45 For the seminal paper in this literature see Vernon L. Smith et al., Bubbles, Crashes,
and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets, 56 ECONOMETRICA 1119
(1988).
46 See generally Gerding, supra note 3, at 983 (“[E]xperimental asset markets serve as a
crucial tool in evaluating the effectiveness of antibubble laws. These virtual markets allow
researchers to create known fundamental values for securities and to test whether experimental
subjects trade those securities at fundamental value.”).
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In such settings, traders almost invariably bid prices above the
upper bound of fundamental value. Such behavior goes beyond
raising an inference of poor judgment to raising one of plain
irrationality. If an asset will pay $1 with 50% probability and $0 with
50% probability, it is difficult to argue that prices above $1 or below
$0 are consistent with fundamental value.47 The experimental
evidence strongly suggests that there is something about speculative
trading that sets off asset bubbles fueled by poor judgment.
The basic setup of the typical trading experiment is as follows 48:
Buyers and sellers are given an allocation of cash and securities. The
securities have a fixed probability of paying a dividend of a given
amount during each round. These securities thus exhibit risk (because
the amount they will pay is random) but not uncertainty (because the
probability that they will pay off is known).49
The participants are told the amount and probability of the
dividend, as well as the number of rounds in the experiment. They
thus have all the information needed to calculate the fundamental
values of the securities. Indeed, in some designs the experimenters
directly tell the participants the expected value of future dividends.50
Traders enter bids (amounts they are willing to pay) and asks
(amount they must be paid to sell) over an electronic network. When
a bid exceeds an ask, a purchase and sale takes place.51 At the end of
the experiment, the participants are paid whatever money they have
accumulated through their holding and trading.
Bubbles are ubiquitous in such experiments.52 Asset prices rise far
above the expected or average value of the securities.53 Even more
strikingly, they rise far above the maximum possible value for the
47 Although prices above $1 could reflect a belief that researchers will burst through the
door and change the rules of the experiment, this seems implausible.
48 This description is adapted from Gerding, supra note 3, at 1014–16.
49 Of course, some uncertainty is inevitable—the experiment may be terminated
prematurely due to an earthquake or fire, or the experimenter might be lying when he or she
promises to pay off according to the traders’ performance. Following convention, I treat such
uncertainty as negligible.
50 E.g., David Porter & Vernon L. Smith, Price Bubbles, in HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 247, 247 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds.,
2008).
51 Participants are aware of the bid and ask queues, that is, how much the other players are
offering for purchase and sale and at what price.
52 See Ronald R. King et al., The Robustness of Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental
Stock Markets, in NONLINEAR DYNAMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS 183, 184–99
(Richard H. Day & Ping Chen eds. 1993) (reporting robustness of price bubbles to a wide range
of experimental treatments ); Porter & Smith, supra note 5049, at 248–55 (same).
53 Note that under the conventional assumption, financial-market participants are deemed
to be risk averse. See FRANK K. REILLY & KEITH C. BROWN, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND
PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 13 (Mike Reynolds et al. eds., 7th ed. 2003). This actuarially
expected value is an upper bound for fundamental value.
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assets. For example, securities that pay off no more than $0.40 per
period will change hands at $6 or more when there are ten periods left
and the securities cannot possibly realize more than $4.54 Moreover,
this happens even when the assets cannot be resold, refuting the idea
that all such outbreaks result can be explained by buyers’ “rational”
hopes that a “greater fool” will come along to buy the assets at an
even higher price. One of the experimenters summarized the results as
follows:
In these asset markets, departures of prices from
fundamental values are . . . due [in part] . . . to the existence
of traders who actually do behave irrationally. It certainly
does appear that other traders speculate when they realize that
some participants are prone to errors. The findings presented
here suggest that the appropriate modeling approach to
explaining the bubble and crash phenomenon requires the
presence of errors in decision making on the part of
agents . . . .55
Further details of some of this research are taken up in the next Part,
which addresses the identification of bubbles. The key point here is
that the experimental evidence strongly suggests the existence of
hard-core irrationality in asset trading markets. That in turn suggests,
a fortiori, the potential for the influence of bad judgment on real asset
markets. It also suggests that there is no principled reason to adopt a
judgment-based explanation for phenomena only as a “last resort”56
after explanations based on perfect rationality have failed.
The experimental evidence is subject to varying interpretations.
For example, Vernon Smith, who won the Nobel Memorial Prize
in Economic Sciences in 2002 for his work in experimental
economics, focuses on the fact that the bubbles are reduced or
eliminated when traders run through the same trading game
54 See Charles Noussair & Charles Plott, Bubbles and Crashes in Experimental Asset
Markets: Common Knowledge Failure?, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS
RESULTS, supra note 5049, at 260, 263 Fig. 2 (illustrating that participants in trading experiment
bid prices of risky assets not just above their actuarially expected value, but above their
maximum possible value). Note that this result was observed in a market where there was no
opportunity to resell the assets and in which the participants were given a table showing the
fundamental value of the asset at each period. Id. at 261. Although the authors of the original
experimental paper concluded that the hope of realizing capital gains is not the only cause of
bubbles, they declined to interpret their results “as suggesting that the conscious pursuit of
capital gains does not occur in experiments of this type.” Vivian Lei et al., Nonspeculative
Bubbles in Experimental Asset Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual
Irrationality, 69 ECONOMETRICA 831, 857 (2001).
55 Noussair & Plott, supra note 543, at 262–63. The experiment on which Noussair and
Plott were commenting is reported at Lei et al., supra note 543.
56 Peter M. Garber, Famous First Bubbles, 4 J. ECON. P ERSP. 35, 35 (1990).
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repeatedly. 57 Erik Gerding, who has examined antibubble
regulatory proposals at length in the context of experimental
economics, likewise stresses the possibility of learning as an
important guide to policy. 58
But the same players never repeat the same game in real-life
financial markets. Not everyone in the economy invests in any
particular financial market, so there is always a potential supply of
new participants, and real-life boom-and-bust events frequently
feature a large influx of inexperienced traders. Moreover, the
existence of uncertainty in real life makes learning more difficult.
New-era stories are always available to tempt traders back into
irrational behavior.
To be sure, experimental economics can be, and has been,
criticized.59 The amounts to be gained in the typical experiment are
small, so the subjects may not care enough to do well (but even small
payoffs have been shown to motivate subjects).60 Subjects are often
undergraduates, unlikely to be as skilled at decision making under
uncertainty as professional traders (but small businesspeople,
corporate executives, and stockbrokers make the same mistakes as
undergraduates, and trade in stocks and houses is not limited to
professionals).61 Subjects may trade just because they are bored and
there is nothing else to do in the time they spend as subjects of the

57 David P. Porter & Vernon L. Smith, Stock Market Bubbles in the Laboratory, 1 APPL.
MATH. FIN. 111, 112 (1994) (“[T]his [bubble] phenomenon disappears as traders become
experienced.”).
58 Gerding, supra note 3, at 1023–25.
59 For a review of additional reasons that experimental-economics results might not apply
to real markets, see id. at 1017–19.
60 See Colin F. Cammerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in
Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY
7 (1999) (finding that small payoffs cause experimental subjects to act in predictable ways),
cited in Gerding, supra note 3, at 1013.
61 See Gunduz Caginalp et al., Overreactions, Momentum, Liquidity, and Price Bubbles in
Laboratory and Field Asset Markets, 1 J. PSYCHOL. & FIN. MARKETS 24, 28–29 (2000)
(showing that the use of business executives and traders had no significant effect on bubbles in
first-time subjects); King et al., supra note 521, at 196–99 (replicating experiments with
business subjects); Smith et al., supra note 454, at 1130–31 (noting the use of professional and
business people as subjects had no effect). A number of researchers have investigated the role of
experience in reducing experimental bubbles. For example, in one experiment investigators
found bubbles when only neophytes traded; the bubbles were reduced when just one-third of the
traders were “experienced.” Dufwenberg et al., supra note 443, at 1731–32. In this context,
“experienced” means that the traders had participated in the same experiment three times before.
Id. at 1732. Although this result is interesting, the authors’ claim that it “cast[s] doubt on the
plausibility of the hypothesis that financial market bubbles reflect the choices of inexperienced
traders,” id., seems overblown because markets present ever-changing uncertainties rather than
deterministic evolution of knowable fundamentals.
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experiment (but bubbles are observed even when subjects are allowed
to do something else during the experiment).62
Despite all these qualifications, experimental results strongly
suggest—although they cannot absolutely prove—that poor judgment
is often at work affecting prices in trading environments.
2. Evidence from Empirical Finance Research
Although it is impossible to prove with certainty that a real-life
market has experienced a bubble, economists have found significant
indirect evidence that the stock market is prone to bubbles. For
example, the volatility of stock prices has been far greater than one
would expect based on a model of the volatility of subsequent
dividends.63 That suggests that stock prices are driven by sentiment,
not just by cool assessments of future dividend flows. If sentiment
drives prices, it stands to reason that optimistic sentiment—including
unrealistically optimistic sentiment—can drive prices upward.
Stocks that had been extreme losers in a given three-year period
dramatically outperformed stocks that were extreme winners,
suggesting that winners had become overpriced64—evidence that is
consistent with investors’ simple extrapolation of recent price trends.
Yet stocks that performed well or poorly over a period of six to
twelve months tended to continue performing well or poorly in the
short term.65 Together, these two findings support the idea that shortterm price-driven momentum66 leads to overpricing that is eventually

62 See Lei et al., supra note 543, at 851 (finding that adding a second market in which
subjects could participate to the asset market in which bubbles were observed reduced volume
on the asset market but did not eliminate bubbles). Moreover, the idea that people trade because
they are bored or want to participate in the experiment in some way supports the idea that high
attention to particular assets fuels bubbles.
63 Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much to Be Justified by Subsequent
Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421 (1981); see also GEORGE A. AKERLOF &
ROBERT J. SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND
WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 132 (2009) (comparing market’s forecasts of
dividends to a berserk weather forecaster who predicts temperatures of 150 degrees one day and
-100 degrees the next and arguing that the forecast is useless even if the average is correct). This
result is noteworthy because the “fundamental value” of a stock is often taken to be the present
value of its future dividend stream.
64 Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact?, 40 J.
FIN. 793 (1985).
65 Narasimhan Jegadeesh & Sheridan Titman, Returns to Buying Winners and Selling
Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, 48 J. FIN. 65, 65–68 (1993).
66 This “momentum” effect has become a central part of many active asset managers’
strategy. Indeed, one study finds that institutional shareholders as a group can be described as
momentum traders. Timothy R. Burch & Bhaskaran Swaminathan, Are Institutions Momentum
Traders? 2 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.som.yale.edu
/Faculty/zc25/Investments/InstitutionalMomentum.pdf.
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corrected—in other words, to deviations from fundamental value that
follow the classic “boom and bust” bubble pattern.
Empirical studies also support the idea that investors with poor
judgment flood into markets during events that seem to be bubbles. In
the stock market, individual investors buy and sell stocks in a herd.67
They buy “attention-grabbing” stocks: stocks that have been in the
news, that have experienced strong returns, or that have high trading
volume.68 Individual investors’ purchases are correlated over time—
they tend to keep buying and selling the same stocks, at least over the
short term.69 And those very stocks do well in the short term and
poorly in the longer term.70 Similarly, Paul Tetlock finds that positive
or negative write-ups in a Wall Street Journal column forecast
positive or negative short-term stock price movements that are
reversed in the long term.71
Individual investors’ tendency to lose money by buying attentiongrabbing stocks whose prices then decline is consistent with the
theory that poor-judgment traders can push up prices during a
speculative bubble, and more specifically that media hype can help
propagate the poor judgment that makes the bubble possible.72

67 See Brad M. Barber et al., Systematic Noise 3–4 (May 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=474481 [hereinafter Barber et
al., Systematic Noise] (explaining that when a sample of individual investors is arbitrarily
divided into two groups, there is a high correlation across groups in the percentage of
transactions that are purchases in any given month); Brad M. Barber et al., Do Noise Traders
Move
Markets?
2
(Sept.
2006)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=869827 [hereinafter Barber et al., Noise
Traders] (“Individual investors predominantly buy (sell) the same stocks as each other
contemporaneously.”).
68 Barber & Odean, supra note 421, at 15–21. Because every transaction must have a
buyer and a seller, these findings imply that institutional investors are net sellers under these
conditions.
69 See Barber et al., Systematic Noise, supra note 676, at 4 (documenting systematic
buying and selling of stocks).
70 See Barber et al., Noise Traders, supra note 676, at 1 (finding that stocks heavily
bought one year underperform stocks heavily sold the following year).
71 See Paul C. Tetlock, Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of Media in the
Stock Market, 62 J. FIN. 1139 (2007) (analyzing the interactions between the media and the
stock market based on the Wall Street Journal column “Abreast of the Market”). Tetlock’s
result is extremely provocative in that he asserts that a purely quantitative, statistical analysis of
the text newspaper column, with the only human input coming in the form of a preexisting
assignment of words to certain categories (i.e., strength, weakness, goodness, badness), predicts
short-term stock performance. Id. at 1140.
72 The results cited above are not consistent with the proposition that all stocks’ prices at
all times reflect the best available forecast of fundamental value. If that were the case, we would
expect any large group’s investment results to approximate the performance of the market as a
whole if trading costs are ignored.
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3. Evidence from Descriptive Observation
For centuries, market observers have been describing the
phenomena around them as bubbles driven by irrational or imprudent
behavior. Although it is certainly possible that all such observers were
describing phenomena that are in fact nonexistent, that seems less
likely than the alternative possibility that bubbles are real. Market
participants are in a good position to know the facts about how their
markets work—whether irrationality or poor judgment as opposed to
legitimate differences of opinions are at play, whether arbitrage
constrains the effect of poor-judgment trading, and so forth, so their
perceptions should not be dismissed.
Lombard Street, a classic study by the British banker and journalist
Walter Bagehot of nineteenth-century London’s money market,
describes one such asset bubble: “[O]wners of savings . . . rush into
anything that promises speciously, and when they find that these
specious investments can be disposed of at a high profit, they rush
into them more and more.”73
Benjamin Graham and David Dodd, who originated the
methodology that underlies equity investing today: “[T]he market is
not a weighing machine, on which the value of each issue is recorded
by an exact and impersonal mechanism . . . . Rather should we say
that the market is a voting machine, whereon countless individuals
register choices which are the product partly of reason and partly of
emotion.”74 Once emotions and reason interact in producing stock
prices, it follows that poor judgment may affect prices.
Graham and Dodd’s most famous disciple, Warren Buffett,
described the dot-com bubble in even more pointed terms: “It was as
if some virus, racing wildly among investment professionals as well
as amateurs, induced hallucinations in which the values of stocks in
certain sectors became decoupled from the values of the businesses
that underlay them.”75
These examples are just a few of the high points. Media coverage
of financial markets also suggests that it was quite common for
73 WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 131
(Peter B. Kenen et. al. eds., Arno Press ed. 1979) (1873). In a similar vein, Charles Mackay’s
journalistic account of financial manias, which is widely read by financial practitioners,
memorably describes the Dutch tulip-bulb bubble in terms that do not suggest rationality:
“Many individuals suddenly grew rich. A golden bait hung temptingly out before the people,
and one after another, they rushed to the tulip-marts, like flies around a honey-pot.” CHARLES
MACKAY, EXTRAORDINARY POPULAR DELUSIONS AND THE MADNESS OF CROWDS 94
(Templeton Publ’ns 1985) (1841).
74 BENJAMIN GRAHAM & DAVID L. DODD, SECURITY ANALYSIS 23 (1934).
75 WARREN E. BUFFETT, BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY I NC. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (2001),
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2000ar/2000ar.pdf.
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market participants in the midst of the recent dot-com,76 housing,77
and credit market78 boom-bust events to believe that they were living
through a bubble. For example, Robert Shiller reports that when
Barron’s asked professional money managers in April 1999 whether
the U.S. stock market was “in a speculative bubble,” seventy-two
percent of the respondents said yes.79 Adam Levitin and Susan
Wachter recently described “demand-side explanations”—
explanations that rely on reduced irrationality or judgment—as the
“dominant explanations of the housing bubble to date.”80
Although some economists disdain such contemporaneous
observations, describing them as journalistic,81 one rarely hears actual
market participants flatly rejecting the possibility of sentiment-driven
bubbles. Although that could reflect media bias, it would be a bit
surprising if the media were shortchanging the no-bubbles theory,
given its prominence among academic economists. The sweep and
persistence of market participants’ description of bubbles as
sentiment-driven phenomena suggests that perhaps contemporary
observers are onto something when they use titles like Extraordinary

76 Kevin Anderson, Dot.com Gold Rush Ends, BBC NEWSONLINE (May 30, 2000, 5:42
PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/766098.stm (describing the dot-com bust as “a return
to rationality”).
77 Bill Fleckenstein, It’s RIP for the Housing Boom, MSN MONEYCENTRAL (Aug. 29,
2005), http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/P123683.asp (calling a “top” to the housing-market
“mania” based on a reading that “gullibility, not apprehension, is the order of the day”);
Housing Bubble Analysis: Interview with Global Economic Trend Analysis (Mish),
EFINANCEDIRECTORY (June 8, 2007), http://efinancedirectory.com/articles/Housing_Bubble
_Analysis:_Interview_with_Global_Economic_Trend_Analysis_(Mish).html
(interviewing
investment-advisor representative Mike Shedlock who described the U.S. housing market as a
bubble caused by poor regulatory policy and “consumer greed”).
78 See JOCHEN FELSENHEIMER & PHILIP GISDAKIS, CREDIT CRISES: FROM TAINTED
LOANS TO A GLOBAL ECONOMIC MELTDOWN 235–38 (2008) (reviewing theories of
irrationality-driven bubbles and concluding that they “have a significant impact on the severity
of a credit crisis”); Mark Gilbert, Credit Market ‘Bubble’ May Be at Bursting Point,
BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2007, 7:28 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
newsarchive&sid=amgdtD2wWyJ8 (quoting a Barclays market analyst who stated that “[w]e
are growing extremely negative on credit markets, which we see as in a bubble,” and Bank of
America chairman Ken Lewis who stated that “[w]e are close to a time when we’ll look back
and say we did some stupid things. We need a little more sanity in a period when everyone feels
invincible and thinks this is different” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
79 SHILLER, supra note 4039, at 72.
80
Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble 38 (Georgetown
Business, Economics and Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 10-16, Georgetown Public Law
and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 10-60, 2010, University of Pennsylvania Institute for
Law & Economics Research Paper No. 10-15), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669401.
Wachter and Levitin argue that demand-side explanations are incomplete because they do not
account for the falling price of housing credit, but embrace the possibility that both a demandside bubble and supply-side effects help explain the bubble. Id. at 6, 38, 49.
81 See Kroszner, supra note 30, at 4 (“To be sure, there are economists and many
journalists who claim they ‘know’ when an asset price bubble is forming.”).
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Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds,82 Manias, Panics and
Crashes,83 Irrational Exuberance,84 and Animal Spirits85 for their
books.
4. Bubbles and the Efficient-Capital-Markets Hypothesis
It is often said that bubbles are inconsistent with what is called the
efficient-capital-markets hypothesis (ECMH). As Eugene Fama, a
longtime proponent of the ECMH, recently stated: “The word
’bubble’ drives me nuts. For example, people say ‘the Internet
bubble.’ Well, if you go back to that time, most people were saying
the Internet was going to revolutionize business, so companies that
had a leg up on the Internet were going to become very successful.”86
Because the ECMH has at times enjoyed thorough acceptance in
the economics profession87 and even the judicial system,88 it is worth
pausing to make two points about it. First, the ECMH may be
consistent with the existence of bubbles; and second, despite its name,
the ECMH is not a hypothesis, in the sense of a claim that can be
directly shown to be false by empirical evidence.
The ECMH states that prices reflect available information.89 It says
that the prices we observe are the same as the prices we would
observe if everyone were endowed with all the available
82

MACKAY, supra note 732.
KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 25.
84 SHILLER, supra note 4039.
85 AKERLOF & SHILLER, supra note 632. The original use of the term in the economic
context comes from Keynes: “Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full
consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as the
result of animal spirits—of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction, and not as the
outcome of a weighted average of quantitative benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.”
JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY
161–62 (1936). Shiller describes the characteristic mentality of “irrational exuberance”
elsewhere as less than a mania and “more like the kind of bad judgment we all remember having
made at some point in our lives when our enthusiasm got the best of us.” SHILLER, supra note
4039, at 2.
86 Clement, supra note 31.
87 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency,
6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978) (“[T]here is no other proposition in economics which has more
solid empirical evidence supporting it than the Efficient Market Hypothesis.”). Andrei Shleifer,
however, argues that this situation has radically changed. See SHLEIFER, supra note 18, at 16–23
(describing empirical challenges to ECMH based on U.S. stock prices).
88 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 (1988) (noting that empirical studies
support the proposition that “the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets
reflects all publicly available information”). The ECMH arose as a description of U.S. stock
markets, largely because of data availability. See Clement, supra note 31.
89 Fama, supra note 11, at 1575 (noting that the hypothesis can be stated as holding either
that “security prices fully reflect all available information” or, less ambitiously, that “prices
reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits
to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs”).
83
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information.90 As others have noted, the ECMH can be seen as a
hypothesis about “informational efficiency”—the speed with and
degree to which a market incorporates information. Informational
efficiency may not imply that asset prices are equal to fundamental
values (“fundamental efficiency”) or are otherwise related to future
outcomes in any rational manner.91 Following this logic, it appears
that a bubble as defined in this Article could occur in an
informationally efficient market if investors process the available
information with poor judgment.92
The distinction between informational and fundamental efficiency
has been challenged,93 but the ECMH is beset by the same problem in
either incarnation: it is not testable. As Fama puts it, “[M]arket
efficiency per se is not testable. . . . [B]ecause of the joint-hypothesis
problem, precise inferences about the degree of market efficiency are
likely to remain impossible.”94 The “joint-hypothesis” problem to
which he refers arises from the fact that the ECMH posits equality
between an observable quantity (market price) and an unobservable
quantity (what the price would have been if everyone were fully
informed). Thus, any attempt to test the ECMH simultaneously tests
one’s theory of prices under full information.95 If one were to find
results potentially falsifying the claim that a particular market is
efficient, one would not know whether the ECMH, or one’s pricing
theory, or both, were wrong.

90 See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REV. 549, 557–58 (1984) (noting that the ECMH posits “a hypothetical identity
between two equilibria in the same market: the equilibrium that would result if everyone knew
the information, and the equilibrium that is actually observed”).
91 See, e.g., Black, supra note 398, at 533 (arguing that the market could be efficient if
prices were always half of fundamental value); Fisher, supra note 3, at 867 (“[A] revised market
price that rapidly ‘reflects’ new information is not necessarily a price that is ‘right’ in the sense,
for example, of estimating discounted future expected cash flows.”).
92 See Allan Timmerman & Clive W.J. Granger, Efficient Market Hypothesis and
Forecasting, 20 INT’L J. FORECASTING 15, 19 (2004) (stating that the conventional definition of
market efficiency “does not rule out the presence of speculative bubbles” without further
conditions).
93 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency
Twenty Years Later: The Hindsight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715, 716 n.4 (2003) (“It is now
commonplace to distinguish fundamental efficiency . . from informational efficiency . . . . [W]e
remain skeptical of the analytical foundations of the distinction.”).
94 Fama, supra note 11, at 1575–76.
95 See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 7, at 209–10 (2006) (describing Fama’s classic statement
of ECMH as a “tautology” and expressing the hypothesis “nontautologically” as predicting
equality between actual prices and prices expected based on a “market equilibrium” model);
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN.
383, 384 (1970) (“The value of the equilibrium expected return [one period in the future]
projected on the basis of the information [available at any given time] would be determined
from the particular expected return theory at hand.” (emphasis added)).
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Another way of putting this is that results that appear inconsistent
with the ECMH can always be explained away by invoking the
unobservable. Thus, the mere existence of a story within which an
apparent bubble is shown to be consistent with the ECMH is not
enough to reject the possibility of a bubble.96 It is not enough to argue
that a phenomenon can be explained within a rational framework.
One must argue that the phenomenon is more likely explained by a
framework in which outbreaks of poor judgment do not affect prices,
rather than a framework in which such outbreaks do affect prices.
That inquiry is likely to rely on indirect evidence. It may be difficult
for statistical tests based on asset returns to reject the efficient-market
hypothesis in a given situation.97 That puts even greater emphasis on
other sources of information. I take up that topic in the next Section.
5. Conclusion
Several lines of evidence—experimental economics, empirical
studies of real-world financial markets, and the persistent beliefs of
market participants and observers—point to the conclusion that lowquality traders can cause financial asset prices to rise and collapse.
Although asset bubbles are sometimes said to be inconsistent with the
ECMH, it is not clear that this is true. Moreover, anyone who doubts
the possibility of asset bubbles on this ground must reckon with the
fact that market efficiency, like the existence of asset bubbles, must
be proved by indirect evidence such as that cited above. Other
rational explanations for markets’ boom-and-bust behavior are
likewise unappealing.

96 In a related vein, it is sometimes argued that booms require a plausible story that a new
era exists—an era in which the boom assets will perform incredibly well. Frehen et al. present
such an argument about the famous Dutch tulip bubble. Rik G. P. Frehen et al., New Evidence
on the First Financial Bubble (Yale Sch. of Mgmt. Int’l Ctr. for Fin. Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 09-04, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=1371007. But such an argument is not inconsistent with the hypothesis that bubbles are caused
by poor judgment. Plausible new-era stories may—and probably do—simultaneously increase
the range of forecasts about the future that are defensible and also reduce the quality of
judgment of market traders by attracting new, low-quality traders and possibly by degrading the
quality of existing traders.
97 Indirect evidence may be especially important given that certain common statistical
tests used to detect potential inefficiency may lack the power to detect violations of the joint
hypothesis, except in very longtime series. See Lawrence H. Summers, Does the Stock Market
Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?, 41 J. FIN. 591, 596 (1986) (explaining that where
market values deviate from fundamental value by a random shock with a persistent component,
set with a magnitude to create a standard deviation of market’s error from fundamental value of
thirty percent, then 5000 years of data are needed to reject the hypothesis of market efficiency).
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C. Identification of Bubbles
It may be difficult to identify bubbles even if we assume they
exist. It may even be impossible to decide with certainty that a given
episode is a bubble, as opposed to something that just resembles a
bubble. But what follows from such observations is not clear. It is
sometimes assumed that a kind of economic presumption of
innocence applies, wherein markets must be treated as rational until
conclusively proven to be bubbly. But why? If we were to approach
the question as one of pure experimental science, the evidence
reviewed above might lead us to believe that there is nothing
particularly unusual about bubbles and that there is no reason to insist
on particularly high standards for recognizing their existence. Indeed,
if we were to rely on the experimental literature, we might dispense
with a detailed factual inquiry and simply treat boom-and-bust
phenomena as bubbles, accepting the possibility of error but believing
that error is minimized by the bubble rather than the non-bubble
presumption.
Wherever we set the standard of proof, we will need some idea of
what evidence will count in deciding whether a bubble exists. This
Section reviews a number of observable facts that one would expect
to see in the presence of a boom and bust driven by the entry of lowquality traders.98 The criteria are drawn from the same types of
sources cited above—experimental-economics research, empirical
finance research, and market participants.
1. Market Indicators
Boom-and-Bust Price Behavior
Boom-and-bust price behavior is not, strictly speaking, necessary
for the existence of an asset bubble. A bubble component to prices
could appear and disappear again without ever having a noticeable
effect on prices if masked by countervailing factors.99 Moreover,
observers of real-life asset bubbles believe that some bubbles may
98 Some of these criteria may be almost as consistent with nonbubble bubble-like behavior
(e.g., rationally elevated but ultimately disappointed expectations) as with true bubbles. For
example, we might expect nonbubble bubble-like phenomena to include price booms and busts,
increased volume of trading, and even the entry of new market participants. But the problem is
not just making fine distinctions, but also gross ones. If the criteria can help narrow the universe
to true bubbles and their closest impostors, we have made progress. In any event, some of the
criteria—such as large changes in net flows from experienced to inexperienced traders—are less
consistent with such an explanation.
99 For example, good-judgment traders could revise their expectations downward as poorjudgment traders become euphoric, and the good-judgment traders could revise their
expectations upward as the bubble component disappears.
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deflate slowly rather than dramatically.100 Nevertheless, boom-andbust price behavior is often thought of as the core characteristic of an
asset bubble, and the theory of bubbles apparently was developed to
explain this empirical regularity of capital markets. It seems highly
likely that a bubble is more likely with a boom and bust than without
one.
In experiments, where fundamental values are known or bounded,
the existence of boom-and-bust (or at least boom) behavior is a
necessary and sufficient condition of an asset bubble. An
experimental bubble by definition will always exhibit a boom. It need
not have a crash because the optimistic traders can hold the asset until
the end of the experiment. But, in fact, crashes are quite common as
optimists dump their inventories when the end of the experiment
approaches.101
Volume Increase
As with boom-and-bust price behavior, market participants have
been treating high volumes of speculative trading as a defining
characteristic of asset-price bubbles for centuries. Although a trading
frenzy is not in theory necessary or sufficient for an asset bubble, it is
certainly what we would expect to see if low-quality traders are
drawn into a market and influencing the price.
Certainly, asset bubbles in experimental markets exhibit highvolume trading.102 As Vernon Smith put it, “An empirical regularity
in those markets that experience a price bubble is for the collapse in
market prices to occur on a trading volume that is smaller than the
average volume in the periods preceding the collapse.”103

100 See Shiller, supra note 27, at E1 (“The bubble metaphor for speculative booms is
unfortunate; real-world bubbles made of soap and water burst suddenly and irrevocably, and
leave virtually no trace. Major speculative bubbles, on the other hand, tend to deflate over a
period of years.”).
101 See, e.g., Porter & Smith, supra note 576, at 112–13 fig.2, 118 fig.4, 119 fig.5, 121
fig.6, 122 fig.7, 123 fig.8 (depicting boom-and-bust pattern in “typical” laboratory experiments
under varying conditions).
102 King et al., supra note 521, at 183, 185 tbl.13.1 (finding that inexperienced traders
produce larger bubbles and higher volume than experienced traders).
103 Smith et al., supra note 454, at 1131; see also King et al., supra note 521, at 183
(finding that inexperienced traders “inevitably” produce bubbles, “[o]nce-experienced traders
yield somewhat smaller price bubbles . . [and] twice-experienced traders yield prices tending to
follow intrinsic value”).
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Increased Use of Leverage
Although bubbles are observed in experimental markets where no
credit is available at all,104 permitting participants to buy on margin
increases the size of the bubble, at least for inexperienced traders.105
A related finding is that increasing liquidity (the amount of cash
the participants have divided by the supply of financial assets) leads
to higher prices and larger inflation beyond fundamental value.106
Although this finding relates to owning more cash rather than being
able to borrow it, it suggests the possibility that being able to
command a larger amount of cash to purchase assets increases prices
and bubbles.
2. Actor Characteristic Indicators
New Participants
The experimental-economics literature suggests that bubbles “tend
to occur with inexperienced traders and not with experienced traders
who have participated many times in the same type of market.”107
There are reasons to believe that real-world markets are less
conducive to learning than experimental markets,108 so that
experienced traders are more prone to bubbles in reality than in
experiments. Nevertheless, the experimental evidence is consistent
with real-market evidence in suggesting that waves of new
participants are likely to help fuel a bubble. For example, one
experimental study found that bubbles are fueled by the cash of
momentum traders and that bubbles pop when such traders’ available
104 See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 45, at 1124 (buying and selling of stocks for cash only
activity permitted in seminal bubble-market paper).
105 See Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 30 (“Margin buying opportunities cause a
significant increase in the amplitude of bubbles for inexperienced traders.”); King et al., supra
note 52, at 188–89 (finding that allowing margin buying increases “all measures of the bubble,
except duration, for inexperienced traders”).
106 Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 42–43.
107 Dufwenberg et al., supra note 44, at 1731–32 (“[E]ven with as small a fraction of
experienced traders as one-third, bubbles are eliminated, or at least substantially abated.”).
108 For an entertaining argument that a (false) analogy between bridge and trading played a
role in Bear Stearns’s collapse, see Malcolm Gladwell, Cocksure: Banks, Battles, and the
Psychology of Overconfidence, NEW YORKER, July 27, 2009, at 24. In a recent experiment,
researchers were able to restart bubbles among experienced traders by increasing liquidity and
the variance of asset returns. See Reshmaan N. Hussam et al., Thar She Blows: Can Bubbles Be
Rekindled with Experimental Subjects?, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 924, 928–29 (2008) (describing
“rekindle” treatment); id. at 933–36 (reporting the results of “rekindle” treatment). Because
traders knew the return variance in the “rekindle” treatment, the bubbles were reignited without
the presence of uncertainty. In the real world, where uncertainty is always present, and
perceptions of the importance of uncertainty are constantly changing, experience seems likely to
be less effective at stopping bubble formation.
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cash is exhausted.109 To the extent that new participants are drawn to
an asset market by recent price increases and the attention they
generate, this finding suggests that new participants fuel bubbles.
Increase in Speculative Motives
Individual investors buy stocks that are heavily covered in the
media and then lose money on them.110 This suggests that individual
investors typically have poorer judgment than average, and the
implication that poor-judgment traders can be induced to trade by
media coverage supports the hypothesis that bubbles can be a form of
social contagion.111 Experiments show that as a bubble inflates,
traders who started out as “fundamental investors” switch strategies
and become “momentum traders”—that is, speculators—and that this
further drives up prices.112 Market participants noted the relative
decline of buy-and-hold stock strategies in late 1990s and the rising
interest in using houses as sources of financing and vehicles for
speculation in the early 2000s.
Increase in Net Sales from More-Experienced to
Less-Experienced Traders
In a poor-judgment-driven bubble, we would expect to see more
sophisticated traders selling to less experienced traders, with the latter
group attracted to the market potentially by hype or simply by price
increases.
Such an expectation is consistent with experimental and empirical
findings, as well as market participants’ accounts of bubbles. In
experiments where traders have different levels of sophistication (as
measured by experience with the specific trading environment of the
experiment), the more experienced participants are heavy net sellers
to the less experienced ones during the bubble period. Likewise,
institutional traders are heavy sellers to money-losing attention-driven
individual traders. Meanwhile, market participants frequently note the
entry of inexperienced traders as a sign of a bubble.113
109 G. Caginalp & V. Ilieva, The Dynamics of Trader Motivations in Asset Bubbles, 66 J.
ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 641, 651 (2008). The analogy to a Ponzi scheme is obvious here.
110 Barber & Odean, supra note 42, at 15–21.
111 Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV.
741, 773–74 (1982) (suggesting unfair persuasion as a basis for applying unconscionability
doctrine).
112 Caginalp & Ilieva, supra note 109, at 652–53.
113 Potentially apocryphal stories about cab drivers giving stock tips in the 1920s are one
example of this. Another is the rise of the “house flipper”—the person with no real estate
experience who buys and sells houses rapidly in search of speculative profit—in the early
2000s.
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3. Irrationality-Inducing Environmental Factors
Hype
If “hype”—media attention, word of mouth, and the like—focuses
public attention on particular assets, one might expect that demand,
and prices, for those assets would increase.114 Experimental evidence
supports such a conclusion. One experiment found that bubbles came
into being even in a market where speculation was not possible, and
that the incidence of bubbles was reduced in the no-speculation
market when a second market was added to the experimental setup.115
The researchers interpreted their results as supporting the hypothesis
that the subjects traded in the no-speculation market experiments even
when it was plainly not in their best interest to do so because trading
was the only available activity, and the subjects were predisposed to
participate actively in the experiment in some manner.116 If these
subjects were trading because they had no other focus of attention,
that is consistent with the hypothesis that increased attention to asset
classes can help spark a bubble.
New-Era Stories
Observers of apparent bubbles in real life stress the importance of
“new-era stories,” narratives that make it plausible to believe that
asset returns will be permanently higher.117 Experimental evidence
suggests that asset bubbles exist even when future cash flows from
the assets are certain,118 suggesting that plausible (or implausible)
stories that assets will do better in the future than they have in the past
are not the sole cause of bubbles. New-era stories may be more
important as a source of hype and attention—a way of getting new
investors to consider and invest in the asset class—than as a source of
optimistic expectations.

114
See Jill E. Fisch & Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the
Regulation of Analysts, 88 IOWA L. REV. 1035, 1078 (2003) (arguing that early 2000s
technology bubble was caused in part by “uncountable cases in which analyst hype alone seems
to have resulted in significant stock price movements,” even though “investors may be aware
that analysts have a variety of incentives to recommend stocks inappropriately”).
115 Lei et al., supra note 54, at 834–35.
116 Id. at 846–53.
117 See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 40, at 106–31 (describing patterns of “new era economic
thinking” from 1901 through the present day); Frehen et al., supra note 96, at 15–16 (identifying
optimistic expectations about the newly developing Atlantic trade between Europe and North
America and about the profitability of then-novel incorporated insurance companies as drivers
of the early eighteenth-century South Sea and Mississippi Company bubbles).
118 Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 27; Porter & Smith, supra note 57, at 117–18.
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4. The Role of Arbitrage
A central proposition for those who believe that asset bubbles do
not exist, or are unlikely to exist in reality, is that even if many traders
are irrational, sophisticated traders will take advantage of that
irrationality by entering into profitable trades. This activity could
keep prices from departing materially from the levels that would be
observed if everyone were rational.119
For example, if foolish people who saw ads for dot-com stocks on
television have bid up the price for a given stock to $110 when the
highest defensible judgment of the stock’s value is $100, then traders
with good judgment might sell their inventories of that stock, or sell
the stock short to take advantage of the foolish people’s folly. This
activity, sometimes called “arbitrage,” would push the stock’s price
back down toward $100.120 If a small number of high-quality
arbitrageurs can command enough resources, they can drive the price
back down to the appropriate level even though vastly outnumbered
by low-quality traders.
Arbitrage is in theory a powerful weapon against asset bubbles. Its
effectiveness in practice is an empirical question, to be determined
from market to market and from time to time. Many markets simply
do not permit easy arbitrage opportunities. For example, it is no small
matter for a homeowner to sell his or her house and take up residence
in a rental because of a housing bubble.
Even where arbitrage is easy, the arbitrageur must confront the
famous saying that “markets can remain irrational longer than you
can remain solvent.”121 If an arbitrage opportunity presents itself, then
that means that the markets have “mispriced” the asset. And if the
asset can be mispriced in the first place, that mispricing can in
principle get worse before it gets better. If that happens, then the
arbitrageur who has borrowed money or stock to take a trading
position will have to put up additional funds as the market moves
119
See SHLEIFER, supra note 18, at 24 (“If arbitrage is unlimited, then arbitrageurs
accommodate the uninformed shifts in demand as well as make sure that news is incorporated
into prices quickly and correctly.”).
120 The activity described here does not meet another common definition of arbitrage,
namely making a truly risk-free profit, as by simultaneously selling gold for $101 per ounce in
London and buying it for $99 per ounce in New York. See SALIH N. NEFTCI, PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL ENGINEERING 30–31 (2004) (“[A]rbitrage-free prices represent the fair market value
of the underlying instruments. One should not realize gains without taking some risk and
without some initial investment.”).
121 This remark is often attributed to Keynes, although it is apparently apocryphal. See
Jason Zweig, Keynes: He Didn’t Say Half of What He Said. Or Did He?, WSJ Blogs,
http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/02/11/keynes-he-didnt-say-half-of-what-he-said-or-didhe/.
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against the position. This can be very risky for highly leveraged
arbitrageurs such as hedge funds. Economists have created models
that formalize this intuition.122
The experimental evidence suggests that introducing short selling
does not eliminate bubbles and may exacerbate them, at least with
inexperienced traders.123 And even when researchers create a set of
informed traders by explaining the setup’s propensity to create
bubbles and permitting the insiders to see the bid and offer flow in the
market, bubbles still emerged in settings with relatively large
numbers of inexperienced traders. The insiders were simply
overwhelmed.124 Futures markets can be used for arbitrage, and
introducing a futures market to the experiment dampened but did not
eliminate asset bubbles.125
The theoretical possibility of arbitrage does not rule out the
presence of asset bubbles, but the ease of arbitrage and the activities
of arbitrageurs in the market certainly are relevant in determining
whether an asset bubble exists.
5. Ex Post and Ex Ante Identification of Bubbles
Assuming asset bubbles exist and can be identified, it may be
difficult for regulators or tribunals to detect them as they are going
on,126 rather than after the fact.127 This is true even if high-quality
122 See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL.
ECON. 703, 703 (1990) (describing a model in which “[t]he unpredictability of noise traders’
beliefs creates a risk in the price of the asset that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively
betting against them”).
123 Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 30; King et al., supra note 52, at 186–88.
124 Caginalp et al., supra note 61, at 30.
125 Id.
126 See SHILLER, supra note 40, at 72 (“[I]t would still be inaccurate to think that most
people have firmly in mind that a feedback process is under way, operating through investor
psychology, and that they are knowingly participating in the bubble but hoping to get out before
it collapses.”); ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 53 (2008) (“[T]he very people
responsible for oversight were caught up in the same high expectations for future home-price
increases that the general public had.”); Werner de Bondt, Bubble Psychology, in ASSET PRICE
BUBBLES, supra note 30, at 205, 205 (“[I]t is difficult to identify a stock market boom, ex ante,
as ‘a bubble that is about to burst.’”).
127 See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 53 (2004) (“[T]he recent performance of the U.S. stock market supports the possibility
of stock bubbles.”); Allan H. Meltzer, Rational and Nonrational Bubbles, in ASSET PRICE
BUBBLES, supra note 30, at 23, 30 (“[I]nvestors may misread signals and, as a result,
misallocate capital. But . . . these errors are found only ex post and cannot be prevented.”);
Michael Mussa, Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, in ASSET PRICE BUBBLES, supra note 30, at
41, 42–43 (“After the fact—after the collapse—a bubble often seems obvious. And, ex post
evidence is surely relevant and legitimate in assessing whether asset price bubbles and similar
anomalies do occur.”); Partnoy, supra note 3, at 756 (noting that bubbles are “difficult to spot ex
ante”); Trichet, supra note 31, at 2 (“After acknowledging the problems to identify a bubble
even after the cycle has collapsed, it is not surprising that the challenge to call a boom a bubble
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traders, who may make their livings following the market, are aware
of bubbles as they happen. For example, the sharp decline in asset
prices that often comes at the end of the bubble may be crucial—
though, again, not independently dispositive—evidence that a bubble
in fact occurred. This suggests that any proposal for dealing with
bubbles might benefit from taking advantage of hindsight, to the
extent possible.
Yet existing suggestions for curtailing bubbles, surveyed by Erik
Gerding, tend to be either static or real-time in nature. Static
interventions are in place at all times, not responsive to specific
conditions. Because they would be always on, their effects (and side
effects) would always be present. Such interventions include efforts
to improve the quality of the information provided to investors and
their information-processing ability, removing barriers to arbitrage,
imposing barriers to markets for unsophisticated traders, and devising
“circuit breaker” rules that halt trading when large price moves are
observed.128 Real-time interventions require policymakers to identify
bubbles as they develop, and thus are vulnerable to the complaint that
they require regulators to have superior foresight to markets. The
main ideas along this line are tightening credit or increasing interest
rates as bubbles start to develop.129
None of the proffered approaches exploits the possibility that
bubbles may be more easily recognized ex post than ex ante,130 that
the owl of Minerva does spread her wings, but only when dusk
falls.131 If that is true, it argues for a conditional response, one that
applies only to phenomena that are asset bubbles, and that therefore
operates only when the frenzy is concluded. These are the
characteristics of the proposal to rescind or modify bubble contracts.
D. Negative Consequences of Bubbles
Bubbles entail several different types of negative consequences.
They reduce capital markets’ effectiveness in directing capital
appropriately, at least under the conventional understanding of how

is of another order of magnitude if the judgment has to be made in real time . . . .”).
128 Gerding, supra note 3, at 1007–12.
129 Id.
130 Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 249–50
(2006) (“The evaluation of whether borrowing is optimal might be made ex ante or ex post.
Economists and economically oriented lawyers prefer the ex ante perspective. . . . At least as
plausibly, the question of optimal borrowing should be investigated ex post, with close reference
to the actual effects of borrowing on people’s lives.”).
131 G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, at xxx (S.W. Dyde trans., Prometheus Books
1996) (1820).
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capital markets are supposed to operate. Bubbles increase price
volatility, which is itself welfare reducing under standard economic
analyses and is therefore a kind of cost. They also increase the
incidence of fraud, which is bad even apart from any economic costs.
And in the existing institutional structure of advanced countries,
bubbles create an apparently irresistible need to bail out financial
institutions that fail as a result of the bubble.
1. Malinvestment
Capital markets are linked to the real economy because they direct
investment to real projects.132 To pick just some of the most obvious
examples, bubbly conditions lead to investments of real resources to
build railroads,133 to lay Internet cable, to spend $1.2 million on a
Super Bowl ad to promote Pets.com,134 and to build large real-estate
developments in American deserts (twice).135 Although some of these
investments may have been justified via the creation of
externalities—this argument is particularly popular in the context of
fixed-infrastructure investments—the more common view is that
bubbles lead to inefficient allocation of real resources through
overinvestment in the production of the nonfinancial assets that are
the subject of the bubble.
2. Price Volatility
Cyclicality is one of the most fundamental empirical facts about
modern economies.136 Smoothing economic cycles is one of the basic
goals of modern macroeconomic policy,137 even though no one thinks
132 See Marcel Kahan, Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices,
41 DUKE L.J. 977, 1005–17 (1992) (describing conditions under which stock prices that depart
from fundamental value will lead to misallocation of capital).
133 See JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA, 1865–
1900, at 232–34 (2007) (explaining how “American railroads [were] built ahead of demand”
between 1868 and 1873).
134 Tom McNichol, A Startup’s Best Friend? Failure: From Dogster to Google, Web
Companies Are Finding that Mistakes Can be Shortcuts to Success, CNNMONEY.COM (Apr. 4,
2007, 2:40 PM), http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/business2_archive/2007/03/01/
8401031/index.htm.
135 FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL
MARKETS 295 (8th ed. 2007) (describing insolvent S&Ls’ construction of desert shopping
centers during 1980s real estate bubble); Christine Haughney, Changing Course to Avert a Glut,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2006, at K1 (noting that 83,400 condominium units were under
construction or proposed in Las Vegas at the time of writing).
136 See JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 182 (10th
ed. 2003) (“Inevitably, growth . . . has [always] been followed by economic slowdown and
contraction.”).
137 See 15 U.S.C. § 1021(a) (2006) (establishing “reasonable price stability” as a federal
policy goal); id. § 3101(c) (same); MISHKIN, supra note 135, at 393–95 (identifying stability of
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that the business cycle is going to be completely eliminated by such
policy. Similarly, smoothing the individual’s consumption throughout
the life cycle by permitting borrowing in youth, saving in middle age,
and drawing down savings when older, is one of the principal
justifications offered for financial markets. And of course, the
classical theory of risk aversion treats price volatility as undesirable
in itself, so a volatile asset will be less desirable than a less-volatile
one with the same average rate of growth.138 Bubble-like behavior—
massive price crashes and the unsustainable price increases that
precede them—are inconsistent with both these objectives. All things
being equal, reducing the incidence of bubble-like price behavior is
desirable.
Even skeptics of securities regulation such as Stephen Choi and
A.C. Pritchard acknowledge that “policymakers might improve
overall investor welfare by limiting securities transactions if they
were confident that they were curtailing primarily speculatively
motivated trades.”139
3. Fraud
Fraud inevitably increases during a bubble.140 This is what one
would expect in any situation where poor judgment reigns and people
see the prospect of large gains.141 Fraud is independently bad, both
because it is wrong and because it results in presumably welfarereducing transactions.
4. Bailouts
When a bubble pops, it may—but need not—imperil leveraged
institutions that are “too big to fail.” It appears that this is a recurrent
pattern across countries, with the controversial recent U.S. bailouts
just the most neoteric example. The costs of rescuing these
institutions are inevitably borne by parties other than their nominal

prices, financial markets, and interest rates as goals of monetary policy); Trichet, supra note 31,
at 2–3 (explaining how identifying events that “expose the financial system to a significantly
increased level of risk” is important for policy makers).
138 See JOHN D. AYER, GUIDE TO FINANCE FOR LAWYERS 218 (2001) (“[W]e tend to
assume that most investors are risk-averse most of the time.”); WILLIAM F. SHARPE ET AL.,
INVESTMENTS 142 (6th ed. 1999) (“In general, it is assumed that investors are risk-adverse . . .
[and] will choose the portfolio with the smaller standard deviation.”).
139 Choi & Pritchard, supra note 127, at 58.
140 See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
141 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 25, at 165–203 (discussing fraud and noting
that “[t]he implosion of an asset price bubble always leads to the discovery of fraud and
swindles”).
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stakeholders, so the costs of bubble-induced bailouts—necessary
though they may be—count as an externality.
5. Summing Up: The Negative Consequences of Bubbles
To be sure, some bubbles are more consequential than others.
Assuming that there were bubbles in both dot-com stocks and in U.S.
housing, the effects of the latter seem far more severe than those of
the former. There is also a romantic conception in which bubbles are
a positive force for good. Perhaps the capitalist process of creative
destruction cannot work unless visionaries can mobilize irrational
exuberance to enlist the resources to build railroads, dig canals, lay
Internet cable, and so forth.142 Even the fraud associated with bubbles
can be seen as a sort of noble lie in the service of a long-term vision
that must elude pettifogging accountants and risk managers. Whatever
this view has to commend it, it is such a radical departure from the
way conventional financial and legal theory looks at bubbles that its
serious consideration lies beyond the scope of this Article.143
Within a more conventional framework, it seems difficult to
establish that episodes where poor-judgment traders take control of
asset prices have significant benefits. It has been argued that measures
to prevent bubbles are bad because they may reduce market
liquidity.144 “Liquidity,” however, is not an end in itself.145 If the extra
liquidity during a bubble comes from the entry of buyers whose
transactions are inherently suspect, then it is hard to see how it is a
good. If the extra liquidity helps perpetuate the bubble, then it is a
positive bad, at least to the extent that the other reasons for believing
that bubbles are bad hold true.
Another typical argument for bubbles—or at least against taking
action against them—could be based on freedom of contract. I discuss
those arguments in detail in Part III, below. Based on the discussion
in this Part, a background assumption for that discussion will be that
bubbles, on balance, have significant negative effects that are not
142 Gerding,

supra note 3, at 1035 (citing DANIEL GROSS, POP! WHY BUBBLES ARE GREAT

FOR THE ECONOMY (2007)).
143 The

obvious rejoinder within the conventional framework to the argument that bubbles
are good because they provide funding for infrastructure is that the bubbles encourage wasteful
overbuilding, at least in the market’s judgment, which is why the infrastructure builders in these
episodes did not have enough revenue to sustain operations and collapsed. Although the canals,
railroads, and fiber optics they left behind continued to add value, that does not mean that
construction was justified ex ante. It seems likely that bubble proponents are aware of this and
are arguing from a different framework.
144 Gregory La Blanc & Jeffery J. Rachlinski, In Praise of Investor Irrationality, in THE
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 6, at 542, 565–67.
145 Cf. Gerding, supra note 3, at 1034 (“Many antibubble laws are, in fact, designed to
deny liquidity to the market.”).
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limited to those who enter into bubble contracts and that are not
countered by offsetting positives.
II. BUBBLES AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
First, a word on freedom of contract (or “freedom of contract”):
Scholars dispute the extent to which the legal institution of contract
can meaningfully and accurately be described as based on consensual
relationships.146 Scholars who embrace such a description are
sometimes called “contractarians.”147
Non-contractarians emphasize a distinction between “contract”
conceived as the set of individualistic, voluntary agreements to be
bound, and “contract” conceived as the category of obligations that
the law will enforce under the heading of “contract.” Noncontractarians argue that not all relationships governed under contract
law arise from actual consent or assent to be bound, citing as
examples the “objective” theory of contract formation,148 practice of
gap-filling in incomplete contracts,149 and the enforceability of
adhesion contracts.150 They stress the importance to contract law of
social norms that may exist outside the parties’ bargaining.151 Indeed,
non-contractarian scholars sometimes suggest that the idea of
“consent” is not helpful in defining the legal institution of “contract.”
On this view, “consensual” is a conclusion about a relationship, not a
characteristic of the relationship that leads to a conclusion.152

146 See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95 (Ronald K. L. Collins ed., 2nd ed.
1995) (1974) (“Speaking descriptively, we might say that what is happening is that ‘contract’ is
being reabsorbed into the mainstream of ‘tort’”); Thomas W. Joo, Contract, Property, and the
Role of Metaphor in Corporations Law, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 779, 796 (2002) (“The
enforceability of Ks [contracts, defined as legally enforceable promises] does not always derive
from actual consent.”). Compare Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM.
L. REV. 269, 269 (1986) (“The five best known theories or principles of contractual obligation
. . . each have very basic shortcomings. A consent theory of contract avoids these difficulties
while explaining coherent obligation [sic] in a plausible and coherent manner.”).
147 See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 697 (1990); Joo, supra note 146, at 780.
148 See Joo, supra note 146, at 790.
149 See Thomas W. Joo, The Discourse of “Contract” and the Law of Marriage, 24 RES.
LAW & ECON. 161, 162 (2009).
150 Id. at 169 Fig. 1.
151 See Braucher, supra note 147, at 699 (“The questions addressed by contract law
concern what social norms to use in the enforcement of contracts, not whether social norms will
be used at all.”).
152 Braucher, supra note 147, at 699–700 (“Use of the concept of consent seems to be
inevitable in explanations and justifications of the law of contract. Consent itself, however, is a
conclusion based on a complex set of normative judgments; consent is not a simple description
of fact.”) (citation omitted).
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In brief, “contractarians” talk about freedom of contract. 153 Noncontractarians, on the other hand, talk about “freedom of contract.”154
Within that (oversimplified) framework, this Article focuses on
“contractarian” thinking, in both its utilitarian and non-utilitarian
varieties.155 It does so not to take a position on the correct approach to
conceptualizing contract law (or “contract law”), but because the
proposition that bubble contracts should not be enforced is harder to
defend, and perhaps more interesting, in a contractarian framework.
One would expect most of the categorical opposition to modifying
bubble contracts to come from the contractarian camp.
Large-scale outbreaks of poor judgment that can be identified on
an aggregate level after the fact are relevant under a contractarian
framework. Such outbreaks reflect widespread poor judgment, factual
error, and fraud, and therefore call to mind the contract doctrines of
capacity, mistake, and misrepresentation.
These doctrines can be understood as sharing a common two-step
structure within a contractarian framework: Step One addresses
whether consent to the contract is undermined by circumstances, and
Step Two addresses what should happen given that the consensual
basis for enforcing the contract is vitiated. Step Two may embrace a
broad range of concerns, but its key feature—common across all three
doctrines—is that it is extraconsensual. It is thus, to the contractarian,
extracontractual.
Bubbles fit into this two-step structure as follows. The lowaverage judgment we observe in a bubble raises the question of
bubble traders’ capacity. Although incapacity probably would not be
recognized under existing doctrine, poor judgment is the condition
that the doctrine is designed to address. Existing doctrine focuses on
individuals who have readily recognizable incapacitating features,
such as minor age. Incapacity in a bubble manifests itself differently:
it is recognized on an aggregate level and is likely to be socially
mediated. Economics’ expanding understanding of this phenomenon
153 See Randy E. Barnett, Why You Should Read My Book Anyhow: A Reply to Trevor
Morrison, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 880 (2005) (“[J]ustice consists of the protection of the
natural rights of several property, freedom of contract, first possession, self-defense, and
restitution.”)
154 See, e.g., Joo, supra note 149, at 162 (“[T]he [law and economics] position . . . draws
rhetorical strength . . . from notions . . . of ‘freedom of contract’ as a categorical good.”); Jean
Braucher, Rent-Seeking and Risk-Fixing in the New Statutory Law of Electronic Commerce:
Difficulties in Moving Consumer Protection Online, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 527, 538 (2001)
(“Disclosure regulation . . . is preferred to substantive regulation because it interferes less with
market processes and ideological commitments to ‘freedom of contract’”).
155 See Joo, supra note 146, at 790–91 (describing libertarian and utilitarian strands of
“contractarian” thinking). Recognizing that scholars in the “contractarian” group may resist the
label, I dispense with the quotation marks in the text going forward, purely for aesthetic reasons.
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supports expansion of incapacity doctrine, just as psychology’s
expanding understanding of mental illness in the last century led to
expansion of the doctrine at that time.156
Bubbles do not necessarily change the Step-One analysis of
mistake and misrepresentation. But both mistake and
misrepresentation are likely to be more common in bubbles.157
Bubbles do affect how all three doctrines should be applied at Step
Two: a rule of rescission would help deter bubbles but might have
high remedy administration costs relative to an approach stressing
equitable adjustment. Case-by-case analysis traders’ reasonableness is
more difficult in a bubble because bubble traders are not normal so
that there is no familiar baseline for reasonableness. And the social
contagion that often spreads bubble thinking complicates fault-based
analysis of Step Two, which is an important part of existing doctrine.
The table below summarizes the structure of the argument.
Doctrine
Capacity

Mistake/
Misrepresentation

Step One
Low average
judgment supports
expansion of
incapacity.
More common
than in non-bubble
conditions.

Step Two
Bubble-deterring effects
of rescission are relevant
even under contractarian
analysis, as do remedy
administration costs;
contractarians embrace
broad-ranging inquiry at
Step Two.
Case-by-case analysis is
more difficult because
traders are not “normal.”
Social contagion
complicates analysis of
“fault.”

The discussion above centers on the existing doctrines of capacity,
misrepresentation, and mistake. But the law’s response need not be
confined to existing doctrinal categories. Bubbles illustrate a problem
for private ordering, one that contract law has not addressed.
Accordingly, the law might respond by changing the structure of

156 See
157 See

discussion infra Part II.B.
discussion infra Part II.C.
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doctrine, as it has done in the past century in response to other
important issues.158
A. The Two-Step Structure of Excusing Doctrines
The doctrines of capacity, mistake, and misrepresentation/fraud
have a two-step structure. Step One in each doctrine can be
understood as addressing whether there is some condition that
undermines the validity of assent. Step Two can be seen as a way of
addressing what happens next: vitiation of assent does not necessarily
lead to excuse or modification. Excuse or modification will advantage
one party; enforcement will advantage the other. Step Two can be
understood as allocating the gain or loss, either with a binary
“excuse/no excuse” decision or by equitable adjustment, which
embraces a more nuanced set of outcomes. And, in keeping with the
contractarian understanding of contracts as primarily consensual
undertakings, the second step can be understood as acting
“extracontractually”—applying, for example, principles of relative
fault and the creation of proper incentives. It is therefore appropriate
to call Step Two the “extracontractual loss allocation” step. I will
refer to a step as being “satisfied” if the analysis of that step supports
rescinding or modifying the contract. That is, if a party lacks
capacity, then Step One of the capacity test is “satisfied.” If the
conditions for rescinding the contract under Step Two are met, then
Step Two is “satisfied.”
The Restatement reflects the two-step structure of the capacity,
mistake, and misrepresentation doctrines, as follows.
1. Capacity
Capacity defenses can be understood as based on the inability of
specified classes of people—minors,159 those affected by mental
disabilities,160 and those who are intoxicated161—to exercise good
judgment.162 For adults who are not under guardianship, the trigger
158

See discussion Part II.D.
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14 (1981).
160 Id. § 15(1)(b).
161 Id. § 16(b).
162 Although a concern with inequality of sophistication, rather than lack of ability to
contract, may help explain capacity doctrines, see, e.g., Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562,
564 (Wis. 1980) (stating that the purpose of the incapacity doctrine is “the protection of minors
from foolishly squandering their wealth through improvident contracts with crafty adults”), lack
of judgment appears to be the fundamental basis, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of
Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 212 (1995) (stating that the
capacity doctrine is “best explained on the basis of the limits of cognition”); Kronman, supra
note 5, at 789 (stating that the law affords a child “protection against his own ignorance and
159 RESTATEMENT
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for the capacity doctrine is inability “to act in a reasonable manner in
relation to the transaction” as a result of mental illness or
intoxication.163
The Step-One inquiry is whether the promisor falls into a category
of people who presumptively have worse-than-average judgment.
Unless the promisor is a minor or an adult under guardianship, Step
One is satisfied only if the promisor’s mental illness or intoxication
renders him or her unable “to act in a reasonable manner in relation to
the transaction.”164
The Step-Two inquiry for capacity under the Restatement depends
on the category of incapacitation at issue, and recognizes that
automatic excuse is appropriate for some types of incapacity and that
a case-by-case rule is appropriate for others.165 The different types of
inquiry can be arranged on a spectrum from most to least likely to
result in discharge of contract duties, as follows.
The polar case of incapacity is a person under guardianship: such a
person has no capacity to incur contractual duties and his or her
contracts are void.166
Next is incapacity based on one of the parties’ status as a minor.
The general rule is that the contract is automatically voidable at the
minor’s option, without inquiry into whether the minor knew what he
or she was doing.167 The same analysis applies to those who, because
immaturity—not merely the advantage-taking of others”). Courts apparently will not, for
example, enforce contracts between minors of roughly the same age, where (presumptive) lack
of judgment is present but inequality of sophistication is absent. See, e.g., S.B. v. St. James Sch.,
959 So. 2d 72, 96 (Ala. 2006) (refusing to recognize the existence of a contract between two
minors because they “lacked capacity to enter into a contract”). Likewise, “the incapacity
defense is applicable even if the party with capacity neither knew nor had reason to know that
the other lacked capacity.” Eisenberg, supra, at 212.
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 15(1)(b), 16(b).
164 Id. §§ 15(1)(b), 16(b).
165 See Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & ECON.
293, 300 (1975) (arguing that capacity rules should “attempt to identify broad classes of
individuals who in general are not able to protect their own interests” because a “case-by-case
analysis of incompetence is for the most part too costly to administer”). Epstein’s general
approach is to minimize the total costs of “enforcing contracts that should not be enforced and,
second, not enforcing those that should be enforced.” Id.
166 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 13.
167 See id. § 14 (“Unless a statute provides otherwise, a natural person has the capacity to
incur only voidable contractual duties until the beginning of the day before the person’s
eighteenth birthday.”). The bright-line rule has been widely criticized by academics. See, e.g.,
Larry Cunningham, A Question of Capacity: Towards a Comprehensive and Consistent Vision
of Children and Their Status Under Law, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 275, 287–94, 376–
77 (2006) (arguing that courts have underestimated the capacity of children to contract and that
expectations of a child’s capabilities should vary by age); Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually
Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43
GONZ. L. REV. 239, 267 (2008) (arguing that adolescents should be presumed to be capable of
contracting and that a rebuttable presumption of incapacity should apply to younger children);
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of mental illness or defect, are not able to understand in a reasonable
manner the “nature and consequences of the transaction”—that is, to
those who cannot understand that they are entering into a contract.168
The type of incapacity least likely to result in discharge arises
when one of the parties is an adult not under guardianship who is
intoxicated or who knows that he or she is making a contract but is
unable to act reasonably with respect to the transaction because of
mental illness. In such a case, the contract is not voidable unless the
counterparty had reason to know of the inability to act reasonably.169
2. Mistake
The mistake doctrine (in both its mutual and unilateral
incarnations), like the frustration, impossibility, and impracticability
doctrines, can be thought of as dealing with situations in which there
is a gap in the parties’ agreement.170 In the Restatement and the
Uniform Commercial Code, the test for the existence of such a gap—

Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of the “Infancy Law Doctrine”: From Incapacity
to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481, 524 (1995) (“The right of disaffirmance as
enunciated in the infancy law doctrine should be eliminated and replaced by a ‘factors’ test to
determine if a minor lacked the capacity to contract.”). Nevertheless, it apparently remains the
law in most jurisdictions, tempered to varying degrees by exceptions for contracts for
“necessaries,” see, for example, State ex rel. Packard v. Perry, 655 S.E.2d 548, 557 n.12 (W.
Va. 2007). And for situations where the minor affirmatively misrepresents his or her age, see
Youngblood v. State, 658 S.W.2d 598, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). For statutes governing
specific situations, see, for example, CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6750–6751 (West 2004) (authorizing a
court to approve a contract between a minor and a third party in which the minor agrees to
perform artistic or creative services or to participate in a sport). The minor’s ability to escape
contract obligations is also limited by the fact that the minor must restore what he or she
received under the contract unless it has been consumed or dissipated. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 14 cmt. c.
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(a).
169 Id. § 15(1)(b) (mental illness); id. § 16(a) (intoxication).
170 See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 58–64 (1981) (discussing mistake, frustration, and impossibility in a chapter
entitled simply “Gaps”); id. at 59–60 (noting that, in the mistake case, “[t]here just is no
agreement as to what is or turns out to be an important aspect of the arrangement” so that “the
court is forced to sort out the difficulties that result when parties think they have agreed but
actually have not”); TREBILCOCK, supra note 32, at 130 (noting that the doctrines address
themselves to “some sub-class of risks that contracting parties simply did not address their
minds to at all in the contracting process”); Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 318 (1986) (arguing that the mistake doctrine “stem[s] from the inability
to fully express in any agreement all possible contingencies that might affect performance”);
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Mistake in Contract Law, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1627 (2003) (“[T]he
principle that a shared mistaken tacit assumption normally provides a basis for relief does not
undercut the agreement of the parties. Rather, that principle, if properly applied, carries out the
agreement of the parties.”).
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the test for whether Step One is satisfied—is the failure of a “basic
assumption on which the contract was made.”171
The Restatement’s Step-Two or loss-allocation rules for mistake
are among its more controversial, reflecting the overall lack of
consensus among courts and scholars about how to deal with this
issue.
Under the Restatement, when both parties are mistaken as to the
same basic assumption, loss will be allocated to the party adversely
affected by the mistake if the risk is so allocated in the agreement, if
the party consciously treated limited knowledge as sufficient, or if the
court determines that it is reasonable to allocate the risk to that
party.172 Otherwise, the agreement will be voidable by the adversely
affected party.173 When only one party is mistaken, that party will not
be able to avoid the contract unless enforcement would be
unconscionable or the other party had reason to know of the mistake
or caused the mistake through its fault.174
3. Misrepresentation
When there is a claim of misrepresentation, the Restatement
provides that Step One is satisfied when assent is induced by a
fraudulent or material misrepresentation.175 The Step-Two (lossallocation) rule in this context provides that the party seeking to avoid
the contract must have been justified in relying on the other party’s
misrepresentation.176 The Restatement states that the Step-Two test
for excuse will “usually” be satisfied in the case of factual
misrepresentations,177 suggesting that contracts procured by or
resulting from misrepresentation typically can be avoided.
B. Bubbles and the Capacity Doctrine—Step One
The capacity doctrine addresses situations where actors’ judgment
is poor enough that they should not be allowed to contract. Thus, if
bubbles are outbreaks of poor judgment, it makes sense to look at
them through the lens of the capacity doctrine.

171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152(1) (mutual mistake); id. § 153
(unilateral mistake); id. § 261 (impracticability); U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (2009) (commercial
impracticability); id. § 2-721 (rescission of contract as remedy for fraud).
172 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154.
173 Id. § 152(1).
174 Id. § 153(b).
175 Id. § 164(1).
176 Id.
177 Id. § 164 cmt. d.
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In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall Shiller’s description of
the impaired judgment that reigns in a bubble:
[E]rrors of human judgment can infect even the smartest
people, thanks to overconfidence, lack of attention to details,
and excessive trust in the judgments of others, stemming
from a failure to understand that others are not making
independent judgments but are themselves following still
others—the blind leading the blind.178
The incapacity that excuses contractual duties generally is limited to
discrete areas: minority,179 “mental illness or defect,”180 and
intoxication.181 But surely not all those whose judgment is poor
enough that they should be barred from making contracts are minors,
mentally ill, or intoxicated. Perhaps incapacity is limited to these
groups because of a fear that the incapacity rules will swallow the
whole of contracts: perhaps the risk of opportunistic invocation of the
doctrine to undermine contracts that ought to be enforced requires
that incapacity be strictly cabined. The refusal to let anyone outside
the specified categories argue incapacity really is a Step-Two issue,
like the rule that children automatically can escape disadvantageous
contracts. The Step-Two analysis of bubble contracts is addressed in
Part III, below.
In any event, the categories in which incapacity can be recognized
are not fixed. Since the middle of the twentieth century, courts have
recognized a major expansion to incapacity doctrine, the motivational
theory of incapacity.
The only articulated test for incompetence in the middle of the
twentieth century was the “cognitive” test. As one scholar stated the
then-existing rule, “[T]he mental disorder, in order to destroy
capacity, must impair the capacity of the individual to understand the
transaction in question.”182 By the 1960s, however, courts had started
to embrace the view that the traditional standard reflected a
“primitive” understanding of psychiatry, in that it “fail[ed] to account
for one who by reason of mental illness is unable to control his
conduct even though his cognitive ability seems unimpaired.”183
178 SHILLER,

supra note 40, at xiii.
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 14.

179 RESTATEMENT
180 Id.

§ 15.
§ 16.
182 Milton D. Green, Proof of Mental Incompetency and the Unexpressed Major Premise,
53 YALE L.J. 271, 274 (1944) (emphasis added).
183 Ortelere v. Teachers’ Ret. Bd., 250 N.E.2d 460, 464 (N.Y. 1969). Ortelere is often
presented as an important turning point in this development. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 15, Reporter’s Note to cmt. b (“It is now recognized that there is a wide
181 Id.
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Courts began to recognize that persons falling into this latter category
lacked contractual capacity,184 and section 15(1)(b) of the Restatement
adopted this “motivational” theory of incapacity as a basis for
excuse.185 The motivational theory gained wide judicial acceptance; a
survey published in 1998 found that only one of twenty-two cases
citing section 15(1)(b) rejected the Restatement’s motivational test.186
The motivational theory of incapacity, in its broadest extension,
comes quite close on its own to invalidating bubble contracts on the
ground of incapacity. For example, a person who contracted to buy
land while in the “manic stage” of a “manic-depressive psychosis” 187
was permitted to avoid the contract.188 Although it has been suggested
that only a “medically classified psychosis” can be a basis for
avoidance on this ground,189 that proposition is not universally
accepted. At least some courts will entertain arguments for rescission
of a contract based on “manic” behavior, even if the behavior does
not arise from a clinically classified psychosis.190
If a person who is in the grip of an irresistible manic impulse—one
that does not arise from a recognized psychosis—may invalidate a
contract into which he entered, then contracts resulting from an
outbreak of poor judgment are vulnerable as well. Recognizing
bubble psychology as a state that can give rise to a specialized form
of incompetency is consistent with the fact that “a wide variety of
types and degrees of mental incompetency”191 are now recognized,
including not just mental illness but also “congenital deficiencies in
intelligence, the mental deterioration of old age, [and] the effects of
brain damage.”192 Under the contemporary theory of volition-based

variety of types and degrees of mental incompetency.”).
184 See, e.g., Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 466 (“On this analysis it is not difficult to see that . . .
she [acted] solely as a result of serious mental illness, namely, psychosis.”).
185 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(1)(b).
186 Gregory E. Maggs, Ipse Dixit: The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the Modern
Development of Contract Law, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 508, 519 (1998).
187 Faber v. Sweet Style Mfg. Corp., 242 N.Y.S.2d 763, 765 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963).
188 Id. at 769.
189 See Fingerhut v. Kralyn Enters., Inc., 337 N.Y.S.2d 394, 400 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971)
(citing Ortelere, 250 N.E.2d at 466).
190 See Blatt v. Manhattan Med. Grp., P.C., 519 N.Y.S.2d 973, 976 (N. Y. App. Div. 1987)
(“[I]t may be that an individual who has not demonstrated a clinically classified psychosis may
still be able to rescind a contract in some instances.”); accord STA Travel (New York) Ltd. v.
Raymond, 603 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that a question of fact existed as
to whether the defendant had the capacity to contract given “evidence of defendant’s manic
depressive condition and suicide attempts”).
191 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. b (1981).
192 Id.
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incapacity, traders in a bubble may be affected by “mental illness or
defect” within the scope of the doctrine.
Even if the idea that bubble psychology represents a “mental
illness or defect” is too much to swallow, however, the rise of the
motivational theory illustrates a more fundamental general principle:
incapacity doctrine can respond directly to changes in other
disciplines’ understanding of human behavior. As argued earlier, it
seems that economics has now come to recognize something that
people have known for a long time.193 Acceptance of this view seems
to be on a par with acceptance of the view that people may take action
because of irresistible impulses arising from mental illness, despite
understanding what they are doing—the change in psychological
thinking that led to the last great expansion of incapacity doctrine.
Turning from doctrine to theory, the idea of rescinding bubble
contracts on capacity grounds is consistent with two contractarian
approaches to thinking about contracts: the utilitarian approach and
the libertarian approach.
Under ordinary conditions, the utilitarian defense of contract
enforcement goes as follows: parties ordinarily are the best judges of
their own utility,194 so that a voluntary exchange presumably is utilitymaximizing for each party when it is entered into. 195 Enforcement is
needed because changed circumstances may cause an agreement that
was initially attractive to become unappealing for one of the parties.
Even if such a change in circumstances causes enforcement no longer
to maximize utility for the contracting parties, defending the
promisee’s ability to rely on the promise and not to face this kind of
opportunistic behavior protects mutually beneficial exchange in
general.196 Contract enforcement maximizes utility not because
193

See discussion supra Part I.B.3
e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 168 (G.K. Ogden ed.,
Richard Hildreth trans., 2nd ed. 1950) (1789) (“[E]very alienation imports advantage’)
(emphasis omitted)). Bentham here means “alienation” to mean the voluntary surrender of
property; the passage begins, “It may be that possessing a thing by lawful title, we wish to
dispossess ourselves of it, and to abandon its enjoyment to another.” Id. See also JOHN STUART
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 957 (W.J. Ashley ed. 1909) (1848) (“The ground of
the practical principle of non-interference [with exchange] must be, that most persons take a
juster and more intelligent view of their own interest, and of the means of promoting it, than can
either be prescribed to them by a general enactment of the legislature, or pointed out to them in
the particular case by a public functionary.”).
195 Bentham, supra note 194, at 168 (“When the question is of an exchange, there are then
two alienations, of which each has its separate advantages.”); see also Eisenberg, supra note
162, at 212–13 (1995) (noting that, with respect to incompetent parties, “the premise of the
bargain principle, that a contracting party will act with full cognition to rationally maximize his
subjective expected utility, is not fulfilled”).
196 Id. at 171 (If exchanges are freely nullified due to one party’s “evil of loss,” “what
security of acquisition do I have, if the seller can break the trade, under the pretence of not
knowing what he was about.”).
194 See,
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enforcement of each and every contract maximizes the joint utility of
the parties to that contract, but because the institution of contract
maximizes social utility.197
On a utilitarian view, poor judgment undermines the presumption
that each person is the best judge of his or her own future utility, so in
a world where poor judgment is widespread enough, enforcement of
contracts loses its claim to be utility maximizing.198 A key feature of
utilitarian, or cost-benefit, thinking is that it is aggregate in nature, so
a sharp decline in average judgment across traders during a bubble
suggests that bubble contracts should not be enforced, even if, as
hypothesized, individual low-quality traders cannot be identified, or if
no one trader is of extremely low quality.
If everyone becomes just a little worse at evaluating the downside
of buying dot-com stocks,199 that makes the utilitarian case for
respecting such purchases just a little weaker. If everyone gets a lot
worse, then the utilitarian case for respecting contracts is a lot weaker.
This aggregating characteristic is important to application of the
excuse doctrines. For example, even if no single trader in the market
is as bereft of judgment as the average minor or intoxicated person, it
is still possible for average quality to be poor enough to deprive the
average transaction of the presumption of ex ante welfare
enhancement that normally applies.
Other scholars analyze contract in a framework that is not strictly
utilitarian, recognizing some value to contract enforcement that is
independent of strict utility maximization. Some such “contractarian”
thinkers, such as Richard Epstein, address contract law from a hybrid
utilitarian-libertarian point of view200 that traces at least back to John
Stuart Mill.201 Other scholars present Kantian autonomy-based
197 See P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 354–55 (1979).
(describing classical utilitarian theory of contract enforcement as “rule-utilitarian,” aimed at
developing “principles of behavior which, taken over all, would produce the greatest happiness”
and not as believing “that each individual act should be weighed in the balance.”).
198 Law-and-economics discussions of contract that focus on the utilitarian goal of
maximizing social welfare frequently cite opportunism and the obviation of costly measures to
protect against opportunism as the fundamental bases for contract enforcement. See, e.g.,
STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 297–99 (2004); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 93–94 (6th ed. 2003). For example, a contract to
build a house will be enforced to prevent the buyer from moving in without paying for the house
and to relieve the builder from any need to post guards to prevent this development. The
comparison here is between enforcement and restoration of the status quo, not between
enforcement and permitted opportunism.
199 See SHILLER, supra note 126, at 41 (describing the “social contagion of boom
thinking”).
200 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 165.
201 Mill himself addressed the issue of competence or capacity in On Liberty. The famous
passage stating that one’s “own good . . . is not a sufficient warrant [for invading one’s liberty],”
and that another’s own interest may be a good reason “for remonstrating with him, or reasoning
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arguments202 that suggest a categorical imperative of promise
keeping. Charles Fried exemplifies this kind of thinking.203 Still
others focus on the function of contract within theories of entitlement
that may trace back to natural rights. Randy Barnett falls into this
camp.204 There is a case for rescinding bubble contracts even under
each of these types of analysis.
No one contests the need for some incapacity doctrine. Milton
Friedman205 recognized that “paternalistic” intervention is justified in
some cases of incompetence. For example, Richard Epstein states that
in the case of incapacity, “it becomes difficult to argue that the
consent, even if given, is in the best interests of the party who has
given it, or that the punctual enforcement of the agreement is likely to
advance the public good.”206 He argues that incapacity should apply
to classes of people who “in general are not able to protect their own
interests in negotiation.”207 Poor judgment resulting from an asset
bubble certainly would seem to impair one’s ability to protect one’s
own interests in negotiation.
At the same time, scholars with a strong commitment to preserving
contract have struggled to define just what limits should be placed on
the capacity doctrine. Barnett and Fried recognize the issue without
attempting to provide precise limits. Barnett argues that an objective
manifestation of consent—the touchstone for contract enforceability

with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him,” immediately
precedes a critical qualification: “[T]his doctrine is meant to apply only to human beings in the
maturity of their faculties. . . . [It applies] as soon as mankind have attained the capacity of
being guided to their own improvement by conviction or persuasion . . . .” JOHN STUART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 16–17 (Prometheus Books 1986) (1859).
202 Criticisms of the view that unlimited freedom of contract enhances autonomy go back
at least to Max Weber. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY 188–91 (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shills & Max Rheinstein trans., 1954) (1925).
203 See FRIED, supra note 170, at 16–17 (“The obligation to keep a promise is grounded not
in arguments of utility but in respect for individual autonomy and in trust. . . . An individual is
morally bound to keep his promises because he has intentionally invoked a convention whose
function it is to give grounds—moral grounds—for another to expect the promised
performance. . . . To abuse that confidence now is like (but only like) lying: the abuse of a
shared social institution that is intended to invoke the bonds of trust. . . . [S]ince a contract is
first of all a promise, the contract must be kept because a promise must be kept.”).
204 Barnett, supra note 170, at 297 (“The rules governing alienation of property rights by
transfer perform the same function as rules governing their acquisition and those specifying
their proper content: facilitating freedom of human action and interaction.”).
205 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 34 (1962). The immediate context of
Friedman’s comment was legislation to protect those who were, at the time, called “mental
defectives.” Friedman likewise recognized the importance and difficulty of limiting paternalistic
interventions: “There is no formula that can tell us where to stop. We must rely on our fallible
judgment . . . .” Id.
206 Epstein, supra note 165, at 300.
207 Id.
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in his view—is not “meaningful” when a person lacks capacity.208
Fried notes that “[i]t seems correct to say, as the older cases did, that
an insane person should not be taken to have expressed his will in a
legally binding way.”209 Although these particular formulations are
not specific enough to allow application and their tone suggests great
skepticism about expanding incapacity, the onset of poor-enough
judgment could meet the standard in all three cases.
Even if one demands a showing that individual traders exhibited
very poor judgment before entertaining an expansion of incapacity, it
is at least plausible that a large fraction of bubble traders are as bad as
minors, the intoxicated, and the mentally ill at trading. This is true
even if low-quality traders show much better judgment than the
classic subjects of incapacity doctrine in other domains. Both the
experimental-economics literature210 and the long tradition of
referring to bubbles as a form of collective mental illness211 reflect
this.
No matter where or how one sets the threshold, if asset bubbles as
defined in this Article exist, then bubble contracts are more
vulnerable on capacity grounds than nonbubble contracts.212
Rescinding or modifying bubble contracts is at least arguably
consistent with contractarian approaches.
C. Bubbles and the Mistake and Misrepresentation
Doctrines—Step One
Both mistake and misrepresentation are more common in a bubble.

208 Barnett,

supra note 170, at 318.
supra note 170, at 63 n.*.
discussion infra Part I.B.1.
211 See, e.g., MACKAY, supra note 73 (titling his book on the subject Extraordinary
Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds).
212 The argument about judgment here has some similarities to Eisenberg’s argument for
applying the unconscionability doctrine to cases of “transactional incapacity,” that is,
transactions regarding complex subject matter where a person of average intelligence lacks the
judgment “to make a deliberative and well-informed judgment concerning the desirability of
entering into a given complex transaction.” Eisenberg, supra note 111, at 763. It differs in some
respects, however. First, Eisenberg relies on unfairness as a reason for not enforcing the
transaction and therefore restricts the defense to situations where a more-competent party
preyed on the other party’s weakness. The proposal here relies explicitly on absence of
judgment—bubble contracts would be voidable by better-informed as well as worse-informed
parties. Second, Eisenberg focuses on ex ante characteristics of the individual transaction (i.e.,
education levels of parties, comparison of transaction price to a fair market value that was
ascertainable at the time of the deal), not on what market events have revealed about the likely
quality of transactions in general.
209 FRIED,
210 See
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1. Bubbles and Mistake
Two distinct types of incorrect beliefs appear to be more common
during asset bubbles than otherwise.213 First, there is the belief that
asset prices “can never go down,” or at least that they can never go
down for an extended period of time. For example, in 1999–2000,
over forty percent of high-income investors “strongly believed” that
the stock market would “surely” be up to then-current levels within
two years after a crash, as compared with twenty-one percent in
2004.214 Even if outright statements that prices “can never go down”
are rare, certain transactions seem to be based on such a belief.
Subprime mortgages, which seem to make sense only if houses are
expected to appreciate, 215 fall into this category. Parties to such
transactions might believe that prices will not go down during the
period of their transaction, rather than that they cannot go down. But
if euphoria is widespread in market bubbles, we would expect the
belief that prices will always go up to be common.
Second, there are factual errors that are likely to underlie certain
common judgments. For example, large majorities of homebuyers in
the United States in 2003–04 believed that “[r]eal estate is the best
investment for long-term holders.”216 Taken literally, this is simply a
statement of opinion, or a prediction about the future. But the
judgment is likely to be supported by exaggerated beliefs about the
past performance of house prices that are incorrect. 217 More generally,
213 Cf. Keith Gessen, Interview with a Hedge Fund Manager, N+1, Fall 2008, at 21, 23
(arguing that “a paradigm shift in finance is maybe what we’ve gone through in the subprime
market and the spillover that’s had in other markets where . . . really basic assumptions that
[people made] . . . were wrong,” and giving the safety of AAA-rated debt as an example of such
an assumption). The mistake doctrine historically has focused on errors of fact. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 (1981) (“A mistake is a belief that is not in
accord with the facts.”); id. cmt. a (“[T]he erroneous belief must relate to the facts as they exist
at the time of the making of the contract. A party’s prediction or judgment as to events to occur
in the future, even if erroneous, is not a ‘mistake’ as that word is defined here.”). Increasingly,
however, the doctrine has been expanded to embrace errors of judgment as well as fact. See E.
Allan Farnsworth, Oops! The Waxing of Alleviating Mistakes, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV 167, 182
(2004) (discussing the willingness of U.S. courts to provide relief based on mistakes of
judgment). Evolution in that direction would provide further support for the argument presented
here.
214 SHILLER, supra note 40, at 58; see also SHILLER, supra note 126, at 69 (“The recent
bubble has greatly encouraged public belief in a long-standing myth—the myth that, because of
population growth and economic growth, and with limited land resources available, the price of
real estate must inevitably trend strongly upward through time.”).
215 For example, Gary Gorton explains that subprime mortgages are designed to work only
if “the probability of a house price increase is perceived to be sufficiently high.” GARY B.
GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 80 (2010) (“The subprime
mortgage, including the possible second-period refinancing, may be expected to be profitable if
the probability of a house price increase . . . is perceived to be sufficiently high.”).
216 SHILLER, supra note 40, at 58.
217 See SHILLER, supra note 1263, at 33 fig.2.1 (demonstrating that real home prices in the
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if a party believes that a particular asset is “the best” 218 during a
period of generalized market euphoria accompanied by widespread
false factual beliefs, it stands to reason that the person’s belief was
formed, at least in part, on the basis of incorrect factual information—
either information that the person heard himself or herself,
information that helped create an optimistic view of stocks that was
communicated to him or her by someone else, or information that
became reflected in the market price.
A belief that an asset “will always go up” or that a type of asset “is
the best” arguably is not a belief about existing facts. Such a belief
can, however, be understood as being about the present characteristics
of the assets in question. It is like a belief that a cow is barren, 219 or
that lumber is not threatened by a currently burning fire220—the
subjects of two famous contracts that were rescinded on the ground of
mistake.
More importantly, modern analyses of mistake and related
doctrines tend to deemphasize whether a mistake of presently existing
fact occurred. Instead, a finding of “mistake” is a type of finding that
the contract cannot appropriately be seen as allocating a particular
risk221—in other words, that a potentially fatal gap in the contract
exists.
From this standpoint, subprime mortgage contracts in particular
seem vulnerable. The belief that the property securing the mortgage is
highly likely to appreciate underlies both the borrower’s and the

U.S. have had modest long-term growth, except for the recent boom). Unfortunately, neither
Shiller nor other researchers have actually interrogated optimistic buyers about their beliefs
about past prices. The author’s casual observation suggests that such beliefs are quite common
and that this would be a fruitful area of inquiry.
218 See SHILLER, supra note 4039, at 57 (reporting that between sixty-one and sixty-nine
percent of high-income Americans “strongly agreed” that stocks were the best long-term
investment in 1996–2001; forty-two to forty-six percent strongly agreed in 2002–04).
219 See Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1887) (holding that defendants had a
right to rescind a contract for the sale of a cow when both parties made a mutual mistake in
believing that the cow was barren).
220 See Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 189 N.W. 923 (Mich. 1922) (holding that buyer
was entitled to a jury instruction of mutual mistake when lumber that was destroyed in a fire that
both parties could not anticipate).
221 See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract
Measures in an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L.
REV. 368, 418 (2009) (application of mistake, impracticability, and frustration of purpose
depends on “notion of allocation of risk”); Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall
Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 2 (1991) (“Mistake and frustration are . . .
two names for the same problem. . . . Every contract is influenced by a ‘mutual mistake’ as to
the proposed exchange of values, if only because present values inescapably reflect projected
but unknowable future values.”); Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term
Contracts: An Analysis Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1, 14–16 (basis for a duty
to adjust lies in desirability of requiring parties to share losses arising from “unallocated” risks).
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lender’s decision to enter the transaction.222 A mistaken belief that
houses must appreciate or have appreciated dramatically in the past
would contribute to each party’s decision to enter the deal.
Contracts of purchase and sale are less vulnerable: Courts often
hold that a contract of sale is the quintessential device for allocating
the risk of a change in price.223 The buyer bets that price will rise and
the seller bets that price will fall. A related argument is that only
buyers, not sellers, are swept up in bubble psychology, so that mutual
mistake is impossible: the seller, being a seller, is betting that prices
will fall and therefore is not in the bubble’s grip. 224
But the proposition that every contract of sale allocates the risk of
all price changes for all reasons sweeps too broadly. The parties
might well contract with awareness of some price risk, but with an
awareness that is warped by the bubble. For example, both parties
might devise worst-case scenarios that involve mild appreciation
rather than total collapse. Put differently, the mere existence of a
contract of sale does not prove allocation of the risk that a bubble is
underway.
Nor does the mere fact of a sale establish that the seller has
escaped the bubble’s grip. The seller might want to sell in order to
invest in a still more promising stock or a still larger house, to
rebalance portfolios,225 to fund a yacht purchase,226 or for any number
of other reasons. It seems likely that in a bubble market both buyer
and seller are more likely than otherwise to hold mistaken
assumptions about the value of stocks. A bubble market fosters

222 See

GORTON, supra note 215, at 80.
N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon Cnty. Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 1986)
(“The normal risk of a fixed-price contract is that the market price will change.”).
224 See Meltzer, supra note 127, at 28 (“Explaining asset market outcomes as the result of
euphoric anticipations creates a problem. Who are the sellers, and what do they think and do?
. . . Perhaps there are degrees of euphoria, so that the less euphoric increasingly sell to the more
euphoric. But this would suggest that holdings become more concentrated as the bubble
expands. Evidence does not support this implication.”). Note that the last point need not hold if
there is a group of nonparticipants who become market participants over the course of the
bubble, as in a Ponzi scheme.
225 Under the standard approach to asset allocation, if a particular asset class in the
investor’s portfolio performs well, the investor should sell some of its holding of that asset in
order to bring its portfolio back into balance. See RICHARD C. GRINOLD & RONALD N. KAHN,
ACTIVE PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH FOR PROVIDING SUPERIOR
RETURNGS AND CONTROLLING RISK 389–92 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing principles of portfolio
revision).
226 Asset gains increase wealth, and microeconomic theory suggests that increases in
wealth lead to increases in consumption. See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 51–62 (1990). If a large proportion of a trader’s wealth is tied up in bubble assets, the
trader may have to sell some of those assets to fund an increase in consumption, even if the
trader expects further price increases.
223 See
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“shared mistaken tacit assumptions”—a principal ground suggested
by Melvin Eisenberg for the rescission of contracts.227
If both parties to a transaction share a belief, say, that stocks or
real estate can never go down “in the long run” because they “have
always gone up over time,” the resulting contract of sale may be no
different from the contract of sale of a cow that both parties believe to
be barren228 or the long-term agricultural lease of land that both
parties believe to be arable.229 Although the parties might have
different views about the immediate future performance of a
particular stock or piece of real estate, or different needs or desires for
cash as opposed to investment assets, they might well be in agreement
on the ever-appreciating nature of the asset being purchased and sold.
Bubble markets will feature transactions between informed and
uninformed traders, transactions where one party has figured out that
high prices cannot last forever but the other party has not. Such cases
may involve unilateral mistakes giving rise to a power of avoidance
even under the Restatement: the informed trader, having identified the
bubble, has reason to know of the high probability that the
uninformed trader is mistaken.
2. Bubbles and Fraud
Commentators have reported for generations that fraud is
widespread in market bubbles.230 In the Internet stock-market boom,
we read that “[p]art of th[e] change in business atmosphere was a
decline in ethical standards, a decline in the belief in integrity,
honesty, patience, and trust in business.”231
The recent real-estate boom, described as a “breeding ground for
market fraud,”232 likewise produced its share of stories. One
particularly notable one is that of Phillip Hill, who stole at least $40
227 Eisenberg,

supra note 170, at 1620–41.
Sherwood, 33 N.W. at 923–24 (“A barren cow is substantially a different creature
than a breeding one.”).
229 See Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262, 265 (Ariz. 1986) (“The belief of the parties that
adequate water supplies existed beneath the property was ‘a basic assumption on which both
parties made the contract,’ and their mutual mistake ‘ha [d] such a material effect on the agreed
exchange of performances as to upset the very bases of the contract.’ (citations omitted)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §152 cmts. a & b (1981))).
230 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 25, at 165–203 (describing increase of
corruption and fraud in market bubbles); id. at 165 (“The supply of corruption increases in a
procyclical way much like the supply of credit.”); see also BAGEHOT, supra note 73, at 151
(“The good times too of high prices almost always engender much fraud. . . . [W]hen most
people think they are making [much money], there is a happy opportunity for ingenious
mendacity.”).
231 SHILLER, supra note 40, at xiv.
232 Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of
Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1327 (2009).
228 See
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million from real-estate lenders and investors through a houseflipping scheme in the Atlanta suburbs, paying dummy borrowers to
submit phony loan documentation to support their purchase of fifty
homes and 250 condominiums at inflated prices from Hill.233
In addition to clear cases of fraud, bubbles may also feature an
increase in near-fraudulent activity234—activity that may not meet the
high standards for pleading and proving fraud but that nonetheless
fosters false factual beliefs, and is particularly likely to do so in
people with poor judgment.
D. Bubbles and the Possibility of a “Gestalt” Response
Bubbles—mass outbreaks of collective poor judgment—present a
problem for private ordering, and the existing contract-law doctrines
just discussed capture aspects of the problems that bubbles create. Yet
few if any courts embrace the idea that bubble contracts should not be
respected simply because they are bubble contracts. Bubble
contractors might have poor judgment but not “as poor as” that of
children or the mentally ill. They might be very frequently mistaken
about background assumptions but those assumptions might not
qualify as “basic” under conventional analysis or might be treated as
judgments about the future that do not trigger mistake doctrine. They
may be more likely to be defrauded, defrauding, or both, but not
likely enough to cause us to depart from the normal requirement that
each element of misrepresentation be shown on an individual basis.
But recognizing bubbles as a space in which private ordering via
contract is inappropriate—because the normal conditions supporting
private ordering via contract do not exist—could lead the law to
respond in a way that transcends existing doctrinal strictures. The
twentieth century offers two examples of contract law’s ability to
transcend existing doctrinal constraints to adapt to realities newly
recognized by the legal system.

233 ALYSSA KATZ, OUR LOT: HOW REAL ESTATE CAME TO OWN US 129–40 (2009); see
also Press Release, David E. Nahmias, U.S. Att’y, N. Dist. of Ga., Dep’t of Justice, Guilty
Verdicts in Major Mortgage Fraud Trial (Mar. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/gan/press/2007/03-14-07.pdf. Hill’s scheme took place between
2000 and 2003, before the bubble had fully inflated. Id. Accounts of widespread fraud in the
recent housing bubble seem innumerable. For two noteworthy examples, see BETHANY
MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS 125–38 (2010) (describing alleged instances of fraud on the part of subprime
mortgage originators); MICHAEL W., HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY
LENDERS AND WALL STREET BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA—AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS
(2010) (providing many anecdotal accounts of lender fraud).
234 See KINDLEBERGER & ALIBER, supra note 25, at 165 (“Much of the fraudulent behavior
is illegal, but some hovers on the borderline between what is legal and what is not.”).
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The first is the creation and extension of unconscionability
doctrine, which obviated then-existing categories defining the courts’
authority (or lack thereof) to refuse enforcement of contracts.
Previously, courts would deny enforcement for unfairness only when
acting “in equity.” Under unconscionability doctrine, courts can deny
all enforcement, not just enforcement in equity.
It might be argued that unconscionability does not reflect the
common-law development of contract because it is statutory in origin:
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that a court
may “refuse to enforce” any contract that was unconscionable when
made.235 Although adoption of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code was an important landmark in the history of the doctrine, the
extension of unconscionability beyond the confines of U.C.C. Article
2—which began even before the U.C.C. went into effect—suggests
that it was equally a common-law development. So does the
widespread adoption of the procedural-substantive framework for
unconscionability, which originates with academic commentary236
and not with the Code.
Moreover, unconscionability can be understood as a response to
the phenomenon of form contracting even though the doctrine is
described as being a doctrine of general applicability. Form contracts
can oppress adhering parties.237 Eventually, courts came to recognize
this and invalidated oppressive terms using the unconscionability
doctrine. In so doing, they constricted the sphere of private ordering.
The same structure of argument applies to bubble contracts: Bubble
contracts help create bubbles. Eventually, courts may come to realize
this and invalidate bubble contracts. In so doing, they will constrict
the sphere of private ordering.
The recognition of a general duty of good faith and fair dealing is
another example of common-law development unconstrained by
existing doctrine. As Robert Summers argues, by the mid-20th
century, courts had in fact applied a requirement of good faith and fair
dealing under a variety of legal theories, including contract, quasi-

235 See

U.C.C. § 2-302 (2009).
Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New Clause,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967).
237 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion— – Some Thoughts About Freedom of
Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 640 (1943) (“Freedom of contract enables enterprisers to
legislate by contract, and, what is even more important, to legislate in a substantially
authoritarian manner without using the appearance of authoritarian forms”). The “legislation by
contract” to which Kessler refers is the use of “[s]tandard contracts . . .… by enterprises with
strong bargaining power”). Id. at 632.
236 See
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contract, and tort,238 but had not expressly articulated a general
obligation of good faith.239 Due in part to the influence of academic
commentary, such a requirement appeared in the Restatement in
1981.240 Although the scope and application of the duty of good faith
continues to be a matter of debate,241 today it is hornbook law that
such a general duty exists.242
In both cases—unconscionability and good faith—courts
transcended existing doctrinal categories to forge general rules at
variance with purely private ordering in order to address pressing
problems. The examples arguably are different from the case of
bubble contracts to the extent that courts were already refusing, say
around 1950, to enforce unconscionable contracts and reward badfaith behavior. The unconscionability doctrine and the general goodfaith requirement arguably were just devices that allowed courts to
reach just results with less tortured analysis.243
By contrast, courts actually do seem to enforce bubble contracts
now.244 Nonenforcement, it could be argued, is a substantive shift, not
238 Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 197 (1968).
239 The Uniform Commercial Code provided that “every contract or duty within this Act
imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement,” U.C.C. § 1-203 (pre2001 version), but not all contracts fall within the Uniform Commercial Code. Even for U.C.C.
contracts, the formulation of good faith in the original text of Article 2—“honesty in fact,”
supplemented by “reasonable commercial standards” of the trade for merchants, generally is not
understood as encompassing all areas in which the requirement of good faith has been imposed.
See Summers, supra note 238, at 215 (“In sum, the Code’s definitions restrictively distort the
doctrine of good faith.”).
240 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 (1981) (“Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”).
241 See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Implied Obligation of Good Faith in Contract Law: Is
It Time to Write Its Obituary?, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 21 (2009) (“[M]ost courts balk at
giving the obligation [of good faith and fair dealing] real substantive force and effect.”).
242 13 RICHARD A. LORD & SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 38:15, at 437 (4th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2010) (“[I]n every contract there exists an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing”); 2 JOSEPH M. PERILLO & HELEN HADJIYANNAKIS
BENDER, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 5.27, at 139 (rev. ed. 1995 & Supp. 2010) (“[E]very
contract contains an implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
enforcement. This is recognized as a common law proposition, and is mandated by the Uniform
Commercial Code, Section 1–203.”); 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS
§ 7.17b, at 393 (3rd ed. 2004 & Supp. 2011) (“The concept of good faith has, in a relatively few
decades, become of the the particularly American cornerstones of our common law of
contracts.”).
243 Cf. K. N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703 (1939) (“Covert tools
are never reliable tools”). Llewellyn’s observation reminds us that even if unjust results can be
avoided in some or most instances indirectly, through creative application of existing doctrine,
there is value in addressing problems in the law head-on.
244 A recent line of cases holding buyers to contracts to purchase condominiums near the
Gulf of Mexico illustrates the proposition nicely. See Stein v. Paradigm Mirasol, LLC, 586 F.3d
849, 859 (11th Cir. 2009) (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for buyer
attempting to avoid contract and remanding for entry of judgment for seller); Rodriguez v. BA
Eola, LLC, No. 09-14725, 2010 WL 4978260, at *2–3 (11th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010) (reversing
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just a device for cleaning up the doctrine. Even so, a prominent legal
historian tells us that there was a time—around 1860—when the law
was in fact much more prone to enforcing unconscionable deals and
constricting its inquiry into bad-faith conduct than it was in 1950.245
With respect to bubble contracts, we may be at 1860, not 1950.

district court’s grant of summary judgment for buyer attempting to avoid contract); Boatwright
v. Carney Realty, Inc., No. 08-0660-WS-B, 2009 WL 3615048, at *19 (S.D. Ala. Oct. 29, 2009)
(“The Boatwrights took a calculated risk when they decided in the summer of 2005 to invest in a
preconstruction c ondominium unit . . . The market for condominiums . . . tanked shortly
thereafter. In this lawsuit, plaintiffs strived mightily to blame others for their misfortune, . . . No
matter how tangled and complex a web plaintiffs have attempted to construct with their
extensive recitation of causes of action, they have not presented sufficient facts to ensnare these
defendants.); Home Devco/Tivoli Isles LLC v. Silver, 26 So. 3d 718, 723 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010) (reversing trial court’s grant of summary judgment to buyer attempting to avoid contract).
The Gulf condominium market is often cited as a paradigm example of the real-estate bubble,
and the courts in these cases recognized as much. See Stein, 586 F.3d at 852 (“[The] bubble was
bigger in Florida than it was in most other states”); Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4978260, at *2 (“The
facts of Stein are eerily similar to this appeal,” where buyers “had second thoughts” after “the
housing bubble in Florida burst”); Boatwright, 2009 WL 3615048, at *1 n.2 (noting that the
court in Stein “could have been talking about this case” when it was discussing Gulf Coast
housing bubble). There is little doubt that these were bubble contracts. In each case, the buyer
sought rescission of the contract after the bubble burst. Yet the buyers did not even try to assert
any theory tied to the housing bubble in seeking rescission. Instead, the buyers in each case
relied on a federal statute, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006
& Supp. 2009), which permits buyers to rescind purchase contracts if the seller fails to supply a
property report. See Stein, 586 F.3d at 852 (describing the statute as “an increasingly popular
means of channeling buyer’s remorse into a legal defense to a breach of contract claim’). The
sellers in each case resisted, relying on an exception of the disclosure requirement that applies to
contracts that “obligate” the seller to construct condominiums within two years, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1702(a)(2), and arguing in each case that the contract obligated the seller to complete the units
within two years. The buyers in each case countered with arguments that the contract did not
“obligate” the seller to complete construction within two years, either because the provided
insufficient remedies to “obligate” the seller under the statute, see Stein, 586 F.3d at 855–56,
or—more commonly—because a broadly drafted force majeure clause rendered the two-year
deadline illusory, see Stein, 586 F.3d at 857; Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4978260, at *2; Boatwright,
2009 WL 3615048, at *12; Home Devco, 26 So. 3d at 721. Although buyers had some success
in obtaining summary judgment on this theory in the federal and state trial courts in Florida, see
Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4978260, at *1; Stein v. Paradigm Mirasol, LLC, 551 F. Supp. 2d 1323
(M.D. Fla. 2008); Home Devco, 26 So. 3d at 719; it appears that all lower-court decisions for
the buyers have been reversed, see Stein, 586 F.3d at 858; Rodriguez, 2010 WL 4978260, at *3,
Home Devco, 26 So. 3d at 723. Courts outside of Florida likewise have found for the sellers. See
e.g., Boatwright, 2009 WL 3615048, at *20. Among other things, the cases illustrate that: (1)
disputes over bubble contracts are fought out on grounds of tangential relevance to the real
issues presented by bubbles; and (2) courts enforce bubble contracts against parties who try to
resist them.
245 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 160
(1977) (“Modern contract law is fundamentally a creature of the nineteenth century. It arose in
both England and America as a reaction to and criticism of the medieval tradition of substantive
justice that, surprisingly, had remained a vital part of eighteenth century legal thought,
especially in America. Only in the nineteenth century did judges and jurists finally reject the
longstanding belief that the justification of contractual obligation is derived from the inherent
justice or fairness of an exchange.”).
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E. Bubbles and Individual Proof at Step One
If bubbles are social outbreaks of poor judgment that can be
detected at an aggregate level and not at an individual level, that has
implications for the application of Step One of each of the doctrines
under consideration. Under current doctrine, the party seeking to
avoid the contract must show that he or she individually lacked
capacity, made a specific mistake, or received a specific
misrepresentation. With respect to capacity, this reflects a judgment
that a party can effectively consent to contractual obligations unless
some individual characteristic suggests otherwise. But in a bubble, a
social phenomenon that is detected at an aggregate and not an
individual level, is what increases the probability that a party cannot
effectively consent. This suggests that the corresponding capacity
doctrine should be applied at an aggregate and not an individual level:
instead of individual proof that one is a low-quality trader, the party
should instead simply have to show the existence of a bubble. This is
true even under an individualistic conception of contract; the social
phenomenon increases the probability that an individual will have
poor judgment with respect to the contract at issue.
The increased likelihood that bubble contracts result from mistake
and misrepresentation supplements the capacity argument. The
greater the proportion of contracts that result from mistake and
misrepresentation, the less the intrusion on freedom of contract
resulting from a rule that bubble contracts will be rescinded.
Figure 1 illustrates how the two sets of doctrines interact.
Unshaded areas represent contracts that should be enforced. The
leftmost box represents the ordinary, nonbubble world. The black dot
represents law’s judgment that a relatively small number of contracts
are induced by mistake or misrepresentation in this state of the world,
and therefore satisfy Step One of those doctrines. The box is
unshaded, reflecting that there is no bubble calling into question the
judgment of the average person.
The second box represents the situation in a bubble, ignoring the
increased incidence of fraud and mistake. The shading reflects the
fact that the judgment calls into question the judgment of traders as a
group. The third box represents the situation in a bubble, recognizing
the increased incidence of mistake and misrepresentation in a bubble.
The increased number of black dots represents that increased
incidence of mistake and misrepresentation. The fourth box represents
a world in which no contracts would be enforced.

9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM

2010]

TAKING BUBBLES SERIOUSLY

57

Figure 1
Interaction of Incapacity, Fraud, and Mistake in Bubbles
The point here is that one might debate the degree to which a
bubble leads us to question the average trader’s capacity to contract.
One might, that is, debate how dark the shading representing the
bubble should be and whether the background shading is more like
the white box on the left or the black box on the right. But the higher
rates of mistake and misrepresentation in a bubble reduce the error, or
the violence to the idea of freedom of contract, inherent in choosing
to treat the bubble world as though it were the box on the right.
Relatedly, it is costly to identify individual instances of mistake
and misrepresentation: evidence on both sides must be gathered,
presented, and weighed. In terms of Figure 1, each black dot costs
money to identify. The closer we are to the black box, the more
difficult it is to justify expending resources on distinguishing whether
each asserted black dot is real. Although adjudication costs may not
bear directly on the idea of freedom of contract, they do bear in a
practical sense on the shape of contract as an institution: it is unlikely
that that the institution of contract would exist in the same form in a
world where adjudication and enforcement were impossible.
F. Bubbles and Excuse—Step Two
1. The Setting of Step-Two Analysis
A common feature of the excusing doctrines discussed above is
that satisfaction of Step One does not end the analysis, but instead
triggers an analysis under Step Two to determine how the law will
respond. Under the Restatement, for example, the response may
depend on whether the promisee had reason to know of the
promisor’s incapacity, whether the nonmistaken party had reason to
know of the other’s mistake, or whether the promisor reasonably
relied on the promisee’s mispresentation.246—Each of these is an
example of Step-Two analysis.
246

See discussionb supra Part II.A.1.
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The key feature of Step Two is that it is extraconsensual, and thus
extracontractual, at least according to the contractarian view.247
Various approaches to Step Two have been devised, but as this Part
argues, none relies solely on freedom of contract (or “freedom of
contract”) as its basis. Instead, Step Two analysis reflects an effort to
accommodate diverse concerns, such as fairness, encouragement of
care, discouragement of wrongdoing, administrability of the court
system, and the public interest broadly construed. The Restatement
frankly calls its approach a compromise,248 and scholars have
described Step Two in like terms. This is unsurprising coming from
scholars, such as those in law and economics, whose orientation is
basically utilitarian. Any number of things can affect aggregate utility
(or, in the economists’ phrase, social welfare) and all those things are
weighed in a cost-benefit analysis. But contractarian scholars who are
not utilitarian also (necessarily) embrace extracontractual
considerations at Step Two. As Charles Fried put it, “[We face] the
inevitability of using noncontractual principles to resolve failures of
agreement.”249
Thus, there is no objection based on “freedom of contract” to a
decision not to enforce bubble contracts at Step Two. What then
should courts do with bubble contracts? Part III of the Article
addresses that question.
2. The Utilitarian Approach to Step Two
Utilitarian analysis, as classically formulated, is a kind of costbenefit analysis.250 In this framework, the question whether to enforce
bubble contracts is answered by totaling the costs and benefits of
nonenforcement as compared to enforcement (with “cost” and
“benefit” broadly construed and not limited to monetary amounts).
247 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17(1) (providing that except in
specified cases, such as promises supported by detrimental reliance and promises to pay past
indebtedness, “the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of
mutual assent to the exchange”). But see Joo, supra note 149, at 162 (“Some commentators
continue to argue as a normative matter that enforceability should be based primarily on
voluntary assent, but many others disagree. Moreover, there is further disagreement over the
importance of voluntary assent as a descriptive matter of contract doctrine.”).
248 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15 cmt. a (“A contract made by a person
who is mentally incompetent requires the reconciliation of two conflicting policies: the
protection of justifiable expectations and of the security of transactions, and the protection of
persons unable to protect themselves against imposition. Each policy has sometimes prevailed to
a greater extent than is stated in this Section.”).
249 FRIED, supra note 170, at 61.
250 See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 9–10, 16–17, (1863) (utilitarianism “holds
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness;” the standard “is not the
agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether.”).
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The claims about “efficiency” of normative economics are typically
cast in the same framework: will a policy or rule “make individuals
affected by it better off in terms of how they perceive their own
welfare”?251
Law-and-economics solutions to specific Step-Two problems have
rested on such appeals to utility maximization, or efficiency. That is
the basis, for example, for Posner and Rosenfield’s proposal that the
costs of contracts that become impossible, impracticable, or frustrated
be placed on the “superior risk bearer.”252
In general, the premise for the utilitarian defense of contract
enforcement does not hold in a bubble, as argued above.253 “The
individual,” who in Mill’s words “is presumed to be the best judge of
his own interests”254 under ordinary circumstances should not be so
presumed when that individual is trading in an asset bubble.
Utilitarians might defend enforcement of bubble contracts on the
ground that nonenforcement undermines the generally beneficial
institution of contract. A homeowner who simply wishes to move and
who suspects that the housing market may be in a bubble might be
deterred from doing so if he or she faces the possibility that the sale
of his or her house will be rescinded because the market is in a
bubble. If the market is in fact not in a bubble, this effect deters
mutually beneficial transactions.
There are at least two counterarguments. First, avoiding the
negative effects of bubbles—volatility, malinvestment, dislocation—
is a good that can be weighed directly against the bad of undermining
security of transactions. Second, the concern with creating uncertainty
in nonbubble conditions may be just a transitional issue.255 If a rule of
251 TREBILCOCK, supra note 32, at 7. A distinction is often made between “Pareto”
efficiency (a change is efficient only if it makes some better off while making no one worse off)
and “Kaldor-Hicks” efficiency (a change is efficient if those are made better off could in theory
compensate those who are made worse off). Id. Kaldor-Hicks more clearly exemplifies pure
cost-benefit analysis; law and economics scholars who have addressed the issues discussed in
this Article have embraced Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. See Richard A. Posner & Andrew M.
Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J.
LEGAL STUD. 83, 89 (1977) (“It is true that each party is interested only in the value of the
contract to it, However, the more efficiently the exchange is structured, the larger is the
potential profit of the contract for the parties to divide between them.”).
252 See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 251, at 117–18.
253 See discussion supra Part II.B.
254 MILL, supra note 250, at 957.
255 Another second-order cost is the loss of hedging opportunities for those who start out
exposed to the bubble. For instance, if a long-term investor owned stocks at the beginning of a
market bubble and perceived that a bubble was taking place, a rule of nonenforcement would
prevent the investor from protecting himself or herself effectively by selling stocks or taking a
short position in derivatives market. Thus, incentives to protect oneself during a bubble would
be reduced, and any information impounded into the price by such self-protective efforts would
be lost. But such trades must have counterparties. It is sometimes said that every hedge requires
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rescission succeeds in deterring bubble formation, then there will be
no bubble contracts to rescind, and less insecurity about whether a
given contract will be rescinded. Fears of inflation decrease over
periods of low inflation, and fears of bubbles ought to decrease over
periods without bubbles.
More generally, freedom-of-contract ideas do not specify any
particular outcome at Step Two for the utilitarian. The proper
response to bubble contracts is the response that will maximize
utility—an inquiry that necessarily involves consideration of a broad
range of issues, some of which are taken up in the concluding section
of this Article.
3. Nonutilitarian “Contractarian” Approaches to Step Two
Contractarian scholars who are not strict utilitarians have proposed
a number of solutions for specific Step-Two problems. For example,
Charles Fried argues for “loss sharing” in cases of mistake when “no
agreement obtains, no one in the relationship is at fault, and no one
has conferred a benefit.”256 Michael Trebilcock proposes “a very
austere rule of literal enforcement” for all but the most exceptional
cases of mistake.257 Andrew Kull would have the law let losses lie
where they fall in cases of mistake and frustration.258
What all these approaches have in common is that they are not
grounded specifically in any notion of freedom of contract. These
authors all embrace “extracontractual” principles for dealing with

a speculator to take the other side of the trade. Prohibiting a party from hedging is preventing
another party from speculating. And the proposal to unwind bubble contracts is a proposal to
replace the market in a limited circumstance because of an identified market failure, so the
contention that the proposal would cause the market to work less well is not really on point. The
argument would have to be that taking away the ability to hedge via a nonenforcement rule
would produce more bubbles by removing a constraint on bubble creation; in other words, the
argument is in effect that rescinding bubble contracts would promote rather than deter bubbles.
256 FRIED, supra note 170, at 71. Fried argues that the court should examine the
circumstances to determine whether tort-like principles require compensation of reliance
interests and whether restitutionary principles require the return of benefits conferred under the
contract, relying finally on a principle of loss sharing when no other principle governs. Id. at
69–71.
257 See TREBILCOCK, supra note 32, at 144. Although Trebilcock’s analysis proceeds
mostly in a law-and-economics vein, his concern with issues other than social welfare as defined
in an economic framework account for his placement under the “nonutilitarian” heading. See id.
at 9 (“I will be centrally concerned with congruences and conflicts between the normative
implications of welfare economics, negative and positive theories of individual liberty and
autonomy, and theories of community.”).
258 See Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall Principle of Contract
Remedies, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 7–8 (1991).
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Step-Two cases of incapacity and mistake,259 appealing variously to
fairness,260 inducing appropriate care,261 practical convenience,262
clarity of rules,263 and the public interest generally264 as underlying
principles supporting their preferred approaches.
Kull’s proposal that losses in cases of mistake and frustration
generally be permitted to lie where they fall is a partial exception. At
one point, Kull suggests that judicial action is justified only
respecting matters that the parties’ contracts actually cover. This
suggestion is rooted in “the individualistic tradition that sees the
distinctive quality of contract obligation in the fact that it is selfimposed.”265 Kull draws from this tradition a “substantial theoretical
argument”266 in favor of “an absolute requirement that judges cease
judging once they reach the boundaries of the parties’ agreement.”267
He appears, however, to disavow this stance, observing that the
individualistic conception of “autonomy and responsibility . . . at
many points does not square with modern assumptions”268 so that in
general it is legitimate to consider broader interests at Step Two.
Even if one were to read Kull as contending that judicial gapfilling is inherently illegitimate, one would evaluate this argument in
the context of the limited scope of Kull’s article, which deals with
contracts that suffer only from mistake or frustration and not from
other problems. Neither Kull nor any other contractarian scholar has
addressed the social outbreak of poor judgment that a bubble
represents
III. RESOLVING BUBBLE CONTRACTS
As shown above, even contractarian approaches—whether
utilitarian or nonutilitarian—sanction an open-ended inquiry into the
resolution of Step Two. This Part considers what approach is most
appropriate for dealing with bubble contracts. It argues that the
special characteristics of bubbles weigh against approaches, such as
the Restatement’s, that rely on case-by-case evaluations of whether
259 See TREBILCOCK, supra note 32, at 144 (in cases of mistake and impracticability,
“contract law cannot be a regime that is entirely internal to the parties to the contract”).
260 See FRIED, supra note 170, at 62, 63, 67; Kull, supra note 258, at 54.
261 See FRIED, supra note 170, at 62.
262 Id. at 67.
263 TREBILCOCK. supra note 32, at 144 (evaluating approaches to Step Two in terms of
whether they yield “determinate rules with clear implications for particular cases”).
264 See Kull, supra note 258, at 54.
265 Id. at 40.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 54.

9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM

62

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2

parties exercised appropriate care. Instead, a case can be made either
for a bright-line rule of rescission for bubble contracts or for a regime
of equitable adjustment that focuses on loss sharing, reduction of
hardship, and the creation of reasonable results on a prospective basis.
The choice between the two rests largely on the tradeoff between the
bubble-deterring effects of a bright-line rescission rule and the high
remedy administration costs such a rule might entail.
A. The Argument Against Case-by-Case Analysis of Care
The Restatement’s approach to Step Two in many respects relies
on a case-by-case analysis of whether parties seeking to escape the
contract exercised due care in protecting its own interests. If Party A
has reason to know of Party B’s incapacity269 or unilateral mistake,270
Party A will be charged with that knowledge and Party B will be able
to escape the contract without a further showing of bad faith or actual
knowledge on Party A’s part. If Party B relies honestly but
unjustifiably on Party A’s misrepresentation, Party B cannot escape
the contract.271 These are all inquiries into whether the parties took
reasonable care to protect themselves. Although such concern with
parties’ vigilance in looking out for their own interests dates back at
least as far as Bentham,272 it is misplaced in the context of bubble
contracts.
Bubbles are different; they are unusual events marked by
widespread, socially mediated outbreaks of poor judgment. They blur
the baseline standard of care. The correct baseline for “reason to
know” or “justifiable reliance” should be adjusted to reflect what a
person in a bubble must do act reasonably or avoid fault. This makes
the application of standards of care to individual cases more difficult
and less desirable, all things being equal.
Analyzing reasonable care under Step Two is not just more
difficult in a bubble. It is also less valuable, at least to the extent an
inquiry into reasonable care is a quasi-fault standard designed to
allocate losses based on what the parties deserve. If bubble thinking is
marked by social contagion and exposure to the contagion is difficult
or impossible to avoid, then “you deserved your fate” seems a little
less appropriate a basis for doling out harsh results than it might be in

269 See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§15(b), 16 (1981).
§163(b).
§164(1).
272 See Bentham, supra note 194, at 171 (arguing that in cases of mistake as to value, “[w]e
must always examine if the ignorance of the seller were not the result of negligence.”).
270 Id.
271 Id.
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other situations. Unavoidable exposure to contagion seems to mitigate
fault.
No one trader is likely to be responsible for the bubble, so if the
bubble reduces the ability to make good decisions, that reduction
should not be ascribed to the fault of the individual trader. The result
here is analogous to the irrelevance under the Restatement of
incapacitated parties’ reasonable care.273 When judgment is
presumably poor enough, reasonable care becomes irrelevant.
B. Rescinding Bubble Contracts
One approach to nonenforcement is rescission, the mutual return
of benefits received under the contract coupled with termination of
existing duties under the contract. Rescission is the usual remedy for
contracts that are voidable on the grounds previously discussed:
incapacity, mistake, and misrepresentation.274 Moreover, a rule of
rescission ought to deter formation of asset bubbles, as described
below.
Rescinding bubble contracts may sound extremely radical and
overbroad, but the idea is no more outlandish than, say, abolishing
summary judgment,275 much less creating a free market in baby
sales,276 or allowing adults to sell themselves into slavery.277
Moreover, this is hardly the first time scholars have proposed to
dispense with the complexities of Restatement-style analysis and
substitute bright-line rules—consider Trebilcock’s “extremely austere
rule of literal enforcement”278 and Kull’s proposal to let losses lie
where they fall,279 discussed above. Both rescission and the
alternative approach of equitable adjustment present advantages and
disadvantages.
Under this approach, the rescission rule would be applied after a
bubble has ended. As discussed, it is easier for third parties such as
273 RESTATEMENT
274 Id.

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§14-15.
§§ 376, 384 (mutual return of benefits conferred generally required when contract

avoided).
275 See John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 522
(2007) (arguing that “our civil justice system would be both fairer and more efficient” if
summary judgment were abolished).
276 See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324, 346 (1978) (reviewing “objections to allowing the price system to
equilibrate the adoption market,” and concluding that “the benefits of free baby selling might
well outweigh the costs,” and proposing “a method of practical experimentation with
introducing a market in adoptions”).
277 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 102, 109–11 (1981) (describing
situations in which slavery “might be wealth maximizing”).
278 See supra note 257.
279 See supra notes 264–75.
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regulators or judges to identify bubbles in hindsight, even if highquality traders are aware of them when they are going on.280 For
example, a price crash itself seems to be a piece of information
suggesting—though not conclusively proving—that high prices
during the boom resulted from poor judgment rather than reasonable
evaluations of future prospects.
For the sake of argument, I assume that any party to a bubble
contract (practically speaking, any buyer) could invoke the rule.
Sophisticated parties could invoke it against unsophisticated parties,
and vice versa. Banks could invoke it against borrowers, and
borrowers could invoke it against banks. A universal rule should help
deter bubble contracts, as both high- and low-quality traders are likely
to be motivated by the possibility of speculative gain. Symmetry also
avoids the need for individual inquiry into trader quality, and thus the
incentive for opportunistic post hoc assertion of low quality. Finally,
a symmetrical rule avoids inquiry into where exactly to draw the line
between low- and high-quality traders on an individual basis.
A rescission rule could apply to any contract entered into during a
bubble, executory or fully performed. Rescission, even of fully
performed contracts, is the mainstream response to incapacity,
mistake, and misrepresentation,281 and, as explained below, bubble
contracts are especially good candidates for a universal rule of
rescission. This could lead to “chains” of rescission, as a condo
purchased in 2008 is unflipped back to its 2007 owner, who unflips it
back to its 2006 owner and so forth. The net effect of the chain of
rescission, to first order at least, would be restoration of the prebubble
status quo.282
1. Rescission and Stock-Market Bubbles
For a stock bubble, rescission entails returning ownership of each
share from the owner at the end of the bubble to the previous owner,
then to the preceding owner, and so forth. At each stage, the seller
refunds the purchase price to the buyer. The net effect of the “chain”
280 See

discussion supra Part I.C.5.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14–16 (1981) (contractual duties
undertaken by parties lacking capacity are voidable); id. §§ 152–53 (mistake may render
contract avoidable); id. §164 (misrepresentation may render contract voidable); id. §§ 376, 384
(duties of mutual restitution arise when contract is avoided on grounds of incapacity, mistake, or
misrepresentation).
282 In some cases this might not be possible. For example, condominium complexes that
were built in response to bubble demand could not be unbuilt. Malinvestment cannot always be
uninvested, sometimes it can only be avoided. As argued below, a rule of rescission ought to be
able to help avoid bubbles in the first place, and thus help avoid the malinvestment that
accompanies them.
281 See
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of rescission is that each share will be returned to its pre-bubble
owners so that no one makes a profit from trading activities during
the bubble. In the context of the dot-com bubble, this rule presumably
would have applied to many initial public offerings that took place
during the bubble.283
In the context of financial-asset bubbles such as stock bubbles, the
question arises whether rescission should apply to short sales and
transactions in derivatives based on the bubble assets. The existence
of a bubble does not itself suggest that short sellers (or any other
sellers) have poor judgment. But every short sale, like every other
sale, has a buyer. Short sales might dampen bubbles because they
place downward pressure on prices, but they may also facilitate a
bubble market by increasing liquidity. Experimental results indicate
that short sales may make bubbles worse.284 Much of the appeal of a
bright-line rule of rescission comes from the deterrence expected to
flow from its bright-line nature. That seems to suggest, at least
provisionally, that short sales should be subject to the rule.
As for derivatives, their value is linked directly to bubble assets
and can be used as a vehicle for speculation on the asset bubble, so it
seems appropriate to include them in the rule as well.285
2. Rescission and Real-Estate Bubbles
For a real-estate bubble, the simplest rule for handling rescission
would be to require the buyer to return title to the property to the
seller in exchange for a refund of the purchase price. This is the way
rescission of real estate transactions works under existing contract
law,286 and it avoids error in determining the current value of the
asset. Such an approach does create practical difficulties. For
example, people who occupy homes they bought during the bubble
would no longer own their dwellings unless they were able to reach

283 See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 577–78 (1995) (discussing rescission
of initial public offerings for violations of federal securities law).
284 See discussion supra Part I.C.4.
285 Note that this proposal does not rest on a conclusion that derivatives inherently
exacerbate bubbles. It is just a proposal that they be treated the same as the assets whose cash
flows they are designed to mirror. There will be of course be challenges in boundary drawing
(e.g., if there were a housing bubble, whether a derivative that is based partially on housing
prices and partially on stock prices should be included), but they are beyond the scope of this
Article.
286 See Renner v. Kehl, 722 P.2d 262, 266 (1986) (ordering reconveyance of leases as part
of rescission); Sharabianlou v. Karp., 181 Cal. App. 4th 1133, 1145–46 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(“Rescission is an appropriate remedy where . . . the contracting parties are mutually mistaken
as to the condition of real property,” and in such a case “the buyer must restore possession to the
seller.”).
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an agreement with the original seller/postrescission owner to
repurchase the house at a current (and presumably nonbubble) price.
Depending on the difficulty of reaching such agreements, it might
be simpler to adopt monetary compensation based on prebubble
prices. For example, assume that a housing bubble existed from 2002
through 2006, that a house sold for $500,000 in 2002, and that the
same house sold for $750,000 in 2006. The situation might be
resolved by ordering the seller to refund to the buyer $250,000,
assuming that the difference between and bubble and prebubble prices
results from the bubble.287
The drawback of this approach is that it requires analysis of
whether price changes resulted solely from the bubble. Physical
rescission, for all its practical difficulties, does not require this
analysis.
Loans to buy bubble assets that are collateralized by bubble
assets—for example, purchase mortgages extended during a housing
bubble—seem to qualify as bubble contracts. Bubbles are often
characterized and fueled by expansion of lending collateralized by the
bubble assets, lending that makes sense only if asset prices continue
to go up because repayment depends on the borrower’s ability to
liquidate the collateral rather than his or her ability to repay from
other resources. Subprime mortgages are a particularly obvious
example of this, but loose margin lending to buy stocks is another.
Yet a third example of collateralized lending fueling a bubble—drawn
from the famous “tulip bulb” bubble in Holland in 1636–37—is the
sale of tulip bulbs backed by letters of credit due at the time the tulips
would be dug up.288
Rescission of bubble mortgages would entail the borrower’s return
of the outstanding principal and the lender’s return of interest and fees
paid. Even though mortgage rescission is an important existing
remedy for truth-in-lending violations,289 rescinding all mortgages
extended in real-estate markets affected by the housing bubble seems
wildly impractical at first blush. After all, borrowers typically will
have no way of coming up with the cash to rescind the transaction
without selling the house, so rescission would lead to the mother of
all waves of forced selling.
287 The treatment and status of this monetary claim in the event the seller seeks bankruptcy
protection is an interesting issue that this article defers.
288 EDWARD CHANCELLOR, DEVIL TAKE THE HINDMOST: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL
SPECULATION 14–20 (1999).
289 See Lea Krivinskas Shepard. It’s All About the Principal: Preserving Consumers’ Right
of Rescission Under the Truth in Lending Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 171, 188–93 (2010) (comparing
rescission under Truth in Lending Act and common law).
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But the owner will be entitled to a refund of the bubble increment
of the house purchase price, the $250,000 in the example above. The
owner might well be able to use this sum plus proceeds from
refinancing to pay off the original lender if the lender wants to rescind
the mortgage.
If the owner cannot recover these funds because the seller has
dissipated them, then the owner and lender have together suffered a
loss due to the bubble. If they both are entitled to rescission, they both
are entitled to be put back in the position they occupied before the
transaction took place. If that is not possible because the seller (the
one who benefited from the bubble) cannot refund the price, then
some principle of loss sharing must be applied. And if bubbles are not
appropriate for private ordering, there is no reason that the losssharing rules should be the ones the lender and borrower set forth in
the loan agreement.
One obvious argument against rescinding bubble contracts is that it
entails high administrative costs in overseeing the rescission of large
numbers of contracts. This objection should be evaluated with respect
to the scope of the problem. The administrative cost of rescinding a
home sale contract seems unlikely to be large relative to the cost of
the house, or to be significantly larger than the costs entailed in
foreclosure. Rescission costs, though high in absolute terms, may be a
secondary issue relative to the other issues presented by asset bubbles.
3. Rescission and Deterring Bubbles
If bubbles are driven largely by the hope of speculative profits,
then rescinding bubble contracts should help avoid bubbles by
removing traders’ incentives to profit. Traders who know or suspect
that a bubble is present have no incentive to transact if they cannot
profit.
Bubbles typically involve a large number of traders who differ in
many respects, including level of judgment and motivation for
trading.290 For simplicity, I will consider only high-quality and lowquality traders in this analysis. 291
290 See Vivian Lei et al., Asset Bubbles and Rationality: Additional Evidence from Capital
Gains Tax Experiments 1 (Cal. Inst. of Tech., Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences,
Paper No. 1137, 2002), available at http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/wp1137.pdf
(contrasting “individually rational, bubble creating speculation” with “a type of confusion or
mistaken understanding” as explanations for asset bubbles in experimental markets and finding
support for the “mistaken understanding” hypothesis from the persistence of bubbles in an
experiment in which a fifty-percent capital-gains tax is levied).
291 See Black, supra note 398, at 530 (“The common element [among models that take
noise seriously] . . . is the emphasis on a diversified array of unrelated causal elements to
explain what happens in the world. There is no single factor that causes stock prices to stray
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High-quality traders may be aware that a bubble may or probably
does exist—recall the seventy-two percent of asset managers who
thought the U.S. stock market was in a bubble in April 1999,292 and
the experimental finding that “traders speculate when they realize that
[other traders] are prone to errors.”293 Even these actors, despite acute
awareness of the possibility that they are in a bubble, often decide to
ride the wave anyway. They purchase assets on a speculative basis for
resale in a strategy called “momentum trading.” Indeed, experiments
suggest that investors can be converted into momentum traders by the
strength of the bubble.294 Such tactics are likely to be dissuaded by a
rule requiring disgorgement of bubble profits.
Even low-quality traders may have their suspicions that a bubble
exists but seek speculative gains anyway because greed overwhelms
fear.295 Someone in such a mental state may be dissuaded by the
rescissory remedy, because it works on the greed side of the ledger.
The bubble trader has pushed the negative scenario of market losses
out of his or her mind, but the rescission proposal works on market
gains. The low-quality trader who suspects a bubble must convince
himself or herself not only that he or she will get out of the market
before the crash, but also that his or her gains will not be taken away
by rescission.
Moreover, if the idea that bubble gains will be taken away through
rescission enters the public discourse, it should work against social
factors such as hype, which may contribute to the spread of
unrealistic new-era thinking that propagates bubbles.
It might be argued that rescission would encourage speculation by
removing the fear of market losses. But if bubbles as defined in this
Article exist at all, it means that markets are given to episodes where
the greed for market gains overwhelms the fear of market losses. In a
bubble, greed is stronger than fear, so it seems hard to argue that
removing both forces will do anything other than push prices back
down toward nonbubble levels.296

from theoretical values, nor even a small number of factors.”); Caginalp & Ilieva, supra note
109, at 652 (“Contrary to the efficient market idealization, there are different motivations behind
trades, and it would be impossible to predict where these motivations would lead without having
a quantitative basis for assessing the impact of these traders.”).
292 SHILLER, supra note 40, at 72.
293 Noussair & Plott, supra note 54, at 262.
294 Caginalp & Ilieva, supra note 109, at 652–54.
295 See FELSENHEIMER & GISDAKIS, supra note 78, at 236 (listing the “greed and fear
phenomenon” as among the explanations for the emergence of bubbles).
296 This argument does not exclude the possibility that the insurance against losses
provided by the rescission rule would turn nonbubble situations into a bubble. It is difficult to
see why this would happen, though, because the rescission rule eliminates the possibility of gain
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Experimental evidence would be helpful in evaluating the likely
usefulness of rescission in controlling bubbles, and it does not appear
that researchers have yet conducted any studies along these lines. One
experimental-market study did find that a fifty-percent capital-gains
tax failed to prevent bubble formation.297 That is no surprise, though,
because capital-gains taxes short of 100% do not eliminate the profits
from successful speculation.298
C. Equitable Adjustment of Bubble Contracts
A bright-line rule of rescission removes incentives to engage in
bubble trading. Rescission, rather than equitable adjustment, also
appears to be the leading remedy in the United States for contracts
that are invalidated for incapacity, mistake, or fraud. But rescission
may be difficult to administer on large scale. Another approach, one
with strong scholarly support, offers greater flexibility and probably
lower administrative cost than rescission. That approach is equitable
adjustment of bubble contracts: judicial modification of bubble
contracts to achieve just outcomes based on what is known at the time
of adjudication. The U.C.C.’s commentary authorizes this approach
for sales contracts that become impracticable,299 and scholars have
endorsed its application more broadly.300
With respect to contracts of sale entered into during a bubble,
principles of equitable adjustment could lead to loss sharing.301 The
house that was worth $500,000 before and after the bubble and that

from such activity.
297 Lei et al., supra note 290, at 1–2. The researchers in this particular experiment
apparently did not conduct any control experiments without a capital-gains tax, so it is not clear
whether the tax had reduced the size of the bubble.
298 The rescission remedy suggested here is much more narrowly targeted than a typical
capital-gains tax because it would apply only to transactions that occur during a bubble. Capitalgains taxes, at least as currently implemented, apply to all transactions (absent special
exemptions) and therefore discourage investment in all capital assets, bubble and nonbubble.
299 See U.C.C. § 2-615 cmt. 6 (2009) (“In situations in which neither sense nor justice is
served by either answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of ‘excuse’ or ‘no excuse,’
adjustment under the various provisions of this Article is necessary, . . . .”); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 158(2), 272(2) (authorizing limitation of relief “as
justice requires” in cases of mistake and commercial impracticability”).
300 See, e.g., FRIED, supra note 170, at 69–71 (suggesting that the sharing principle should
apply to mistake and other “contractual gaps” when both parties are harmed, neither is at fault,
and neither benefits); Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71
IND. L.J. 45, 45–46 (1995) (arguing that courts do and should modify contracts in order to
satisfy the principles of “loss alignment” (a party should not be able to profit from the other
party’s unexpected loss) and “unselfish performance” (a party should not be able to enforce
terms allowing it to gain from threatening to impose a significant joint loss on the parties)).
301 See W.F. Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19, 21 (1981) (discussing
“simple, split-the-difference idea[s]”).

9/19/2010 4:34:59 PM

70

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2

changed hands for $1 million at the height of the bubble might lead to
a claim for $250,000 on the borrower’s part. Indeed, to the extent that
bubbles present unfamiliar territory for applying subtle approaches to
adjustment, simple loss sharing of the sort suggested by Fried302
might be especially attractive.
The attraction of equitable adjustment may be clearest in
connection with bubble mortgages. An ongoing battle over mortgage
modifications continues to play out in the aftermath of the recent
housing bubble, with several government programs aimed at inducing
“win-win” modifications falling short of their intended effectiveness.
Against this backdrop, some scholars have argued that Congress
should take the lead to abrogate or modify mortgage contracts in the
exercise of its power to regulate the macroeconomy.303 The leading
counterargument is that mortgage modification by statute solely on
the ground of economic emergency would interfere inappropriately
with private contract.304 Because this Article presents an argument
against enforcement of bubble contracts from within the freedom-ofcontract tradition, rather than an argument that an emergency
overcomes contract values, the argument here should be less open to
charges of unrestrained statism.
Of course, what outcome is “just” will inevitably be disputed. For
that reason, equitable adjustment as opposed to rescission may be
attacked as standardless, even anarchic. This Article does not attempt
to resolve that debate. Instead, the aim here is to demonstrate that
“freedom of contract” is not in itself a sufficient reason to enforce
bubble contracts, and identify potential approaches to dealing with
that situation.

302 See

supra note 240.
Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin. Rewriting Frankenstein Contracts: Workout
Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1134–35,
1151–52 (2009) (arguing based on the Gold Clause Cases that Congress has “broad power to
rewrite [private] contracts where they interfere[] with otherwise lawful federal policies,” that
such power is “particularly expansive with respect to the macroeconomy” and suggesting that
action in that vein might be justified to overcome contractual barriers to mortgage
modification). Indeed, Congress has modified some mortgage contracts, albeit in ways that
advantage servicers as against investors, rather than borrowers as against lenders.
304 See Peter J. Leo, The Case for “Cramdown”: Eliminating the Practical and Ideological
Barriers to Pure Mortgage Modifications, 18 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 257, 273–76 (2010)
(summarizing freedom-of-contract arguments against mortgage modification by bankruptcy
judges); see also Peter L. Cockrell, Subprime Solutions to the Housing Crisis: Constitutional
Problems with the Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1149, 1150–51 (2010) (arguing that Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, which
immunizes mortgage servicers from investor suits arising from certain mortgage modifications
“raises serious constitutional concerns” because it deprives investors of contract rights).
303 See
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CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that bubbles driven by traders with poor
judgment exist, can be identified on an aggregate level, and have
negative effects on parties who are not involved in the bubble
markets. If those premises are accepted, then failing to respect bubble
contracts—rescinding bubble transactions or equitably adjusting them
—makes sense and should pass muster, even according to scholars
and courts committed to the individualistic notions of freedom of
contract that I have called “contractarian.” Nonenforcement follows
from the poor judgment endemic to bubbles as I define them. That
poor judgment suggests that private ordering is inappropriate in
episodes that are revealed to be bubbles, for the reasons that underlie
the incapacity, mistake, and misrepresentation doctrines.
The decision whether to adopt a bright-line rule of rescission
versus one of equitable adjustment depends on a judgment about the
relative importance of deterring bubbles and retaining flexibility in
dealing with them. The former supports a bright-line rule of
rescission; the latter supports equitable adjustment.

